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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Fanning is a financially risky undertaking. It is natural, therefore, that the 
risk-averse producer shoukl seek means to reduce the level of variability in the return 
on his investment. Recognizing this potential market, a number of private insurance 
firms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ventured into the business of 
writing policies guaranteeing a certain level of revenue per acre of produaion. 
However, no firm that wrote muhiple-peril crop insurance policies did so for very 
long (Gardner and Kramer 1986, Kramer 1983). Among the reasons Gardner and 
Kramer list as causes for these &ilures of privately provided crop insurance is the 
insurance firms' failure to spread their risks across the entire range of produak)n 
areas. In each move into the crop insurance market there was an "inadequate 
geographical dispersion of risks". This coukl be restated as "fiiilure to sufficiently 
diversify." 
Among the conditions necessary for a panicular risk to be insurable is the 
absence of "catastrophe" losses (Vaughan and Vaughan 1996). Exclusion of 
catastrophic losses here means that losses do not occur simultaneously among a high 
proportnn of the insured panies. This conditwn will be met if losses among the 
insured risks are independent of one another. If the sources of risk are independent, 
the insurer can eliminate a great deal of risk by holding a diversified portfolio of the 
risky liabilities. 
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Therefore, one might infer that it is the assertion of Gardner and Kramer that 
the early experiments with market-provided crop insurance wouM have been less 
likely to have failed had the insurers had a better-diversified book of business rather 
than having their policies insuring only farmers in one part of the country. However, 
a well-diversified portfolio of crop insurance policies does not necessarily mean that 
the total portfolio risk reaches a level that is acceptable to private insurers. In the crop 
insurance market, unlike the risks in other insurance markets, pooling does little to 
mitigate the level of risk (Quiggin 1994). 
Miranda and Glauber (1997) examined the effect that the positive correlation 
of yields has on the risk level of crop insurance. Using a model which generates 
yields for individual producers, the coefficient of variation (CV) for indemnities is 
computed for the ten largest crop insurance firms first imposing existing correlation 
levels, then assuming zero correlation among yields. The authors find that the 
ccefTicient of variatk}n ranges between 0.67 and 1.30 for the ten firms. These are 
between 22 and 49 times the levels of the coefficient of variation for generated 
indemnities when zero correlatbn among yields is assumed. On the surface, it does 
not appear that these high CV levels are due to poor diversification practkes as the 
authors give the CV level for the U.S. total—0.81. This level of variability is much 
higher than that seen in other lines of insurance which have existed without the level 
of government paiticipatk)n that has existed in the crop insurance market. 
A means of disposing of unacceptable risk must exist lest the profit motive be 
completely overcome by risk aversk>n. Such a means is provkled to participating 
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insurers in the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA). The SRA provides for a 
transfer of a portion of losses that can occur with widespread yield shortfiUls in 
exchange for a portion of the gains when premiums are greater than indenmities. 
This leaves the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) in its role as reinsurer 
with an uncertain level of total outlays. As has been mentioned, the high positive 
correlation among yields makes feast or fiunine returns to the insurer more likely than 
they would otherwise be. This risk is magnifled when it is passed to the FCIC 
because of the non-proportional form of the reinsurance. The SRA yields an 
increasing proportion of the firms' profits as positive returns increase and commits 
the FCIC to taking responsibility for an increasing proportk>n of the k>sses as these 
increase. In order for the FCIC to have some notion of its own risk exposure, a model 
can be constructed which simulates the behavior of agricuhural productran. 
Objectives 
There are three main objectives of this study. The first is to construct the 
essemials of the distribution functions which describe the risk exposure to the FCIC 
when provkling reinsurance services to private firms. The study will consider the 
largest sources of risk to the FCIC-Muhiple Peril Crop Insurance also known as 
Actual Production History insurance (APH), Group Risk Plan (GRP), and Crop 
Revenue Coverage (CRC). The crops that will be included in the study are com, 
soybeans, and wheat. These represent the largest of the crops insured by these 
programs. Accomplishment of this first part will allow the FCIC to determine how 
4 
much should be budgeted annually to reserves to avoid being short of funds for 
reinsurance obligations for any desired level of confidence. The figure which 
represents this dollar amount is called the value at risk (VAR). It is merely the dollar 
value on the horizontal axis that marks the (e.g.) S% level in the tail of the density 
function of costs (Jorion 1997), 
In finding the distribution of reinsurance costs to the FCIC, the second 
objective will also be met. The details of the Standard Reinsurance Agreement are 
determined by government policymakers. It is presented to insurers as a "take it or 
leave it" offer. It is not a product of market forces. As it is not a product of the 
market, not subject to any sort of bidding process, and does not come about as a 
product of the reinsurer's profit motive, the value of the SRA cannot be derived by 
examining the transaction price as if it were a derivative contraa traded in the market. 
The second objective is, therefore, to estimate the foir market value of the SRA-the 
amount which the reinsurer couM obtain for the agreement or the amount the insurers 
would be willing to pay for it. 
The third objective of this study is to determine the extent to which the risk 
accepted by the reinsurer coukl be hedged using natk>nal area-yield and commodity 
price contracts. This portbn of the study will demonstrate the possible reduction in 
necessary reserve funds (determined in the first portton) which can be obtained by 
holding securities that increase in value when events occur that cause claims to 
increase. For example, hokling put opttons on com yields will offset some of the 
payment obligatbns of the reinsuring party when there is a widespread decline in 
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com yields. The &ct that the reinsurer holds these put options which increase in 
value under the above scenario means that less has to be budgeted to reserves. The 
second part of the study will examine this relationship. 
This work will examine crop insurance from the point of view of a reinsurer 
who pools risk from the business of several insurance companies. The actual 
situation faced by the FCIC in its role as the provider of reinsurance to crop insurers 
as described in the Standard Reinsurance Agreement is analyzed. In their paper 
(discussed below), Miranda and Glauber examined the role the options market couki 
play as a hedge for insurers with different books of business. In their concluding 
remarks, the case was made that the derivatives market could be used as a substitute 
to government provisk)n of reinsurance services. While this may very well be the 
case, the FCIC/RMA has both regulatory and oversight responsibilities as well as 
service obligattons. Authorities may be hesitant to permit (or require) insurers to use 
the market to rid themselves of systemic risk for fear that hedging activities may lead 
to speculative activities. Well founded or not, regulators may fear that extreme losses 
by private insurers in derivatives markets could lead to the withdrawal of crop 
insurance services from the market. 
Therefore, this work examines the possible advantages to the reinsurer of the 
firm's participatk>n in the derivatives market. The klea of government participation in 
the derivatives market as seller and buyer should definitely not be viewed as a 
prospect without potential adverse affects to current participants in the market. The 
analysis that foUows, however, can be seen a discussion regarding one aspect which 
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motivates government involvement in the crop insurance market. That aspect of the 
market is the great variance in returns resulting from high correlation among risks 
making the portfolio of said risks difficult to diversify. The options market's risk-
reducing potential to the FCIC in its role as the provider of reinsurance services is 
examined and discussed, rather than the potential the market has of replacing the 
FCIC. If, however, the existence of and the use of yield derivatives substantially 
reduces the variance of costs to the FCIC, it may be the case that the responsibility of 
reinsurance coukl be passed on to a non-governmental firm. While the proceeding 
investigation will make no more mention on the subject, one could infer that risk 
reductk>n by a govemmem reinsurer via use of derivatives as seen in the analysis that 
follows can also be achieved via their use by a privatized reinsurer. 
Organization 
The remainder of this work will proceed as follows: The next chapter, entitled 
"Literature Review," will examine the relevant literature on crop insurance and on the 
risk-reducing usage of commodity futures and options. In chapter three, "Methods," 
the procedures used to construct the simulation model are described. The simulatbn 
results are then assembled to describe the distribution of costs and are reported in the 
chapter entitled "Simulation Results." As the secondary inquiry into risk-reducing 
potential of yield contracts for the reinsurer builds upon the results of the first portion, 
both the procedures and findings will be presented in a subsectk)n of the results. A 
summary concludes the work in the chapter entitled "Conclusion". 
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CHAPTER! 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on the topic. The first portion 
examines the work that has been done in the field of crop insurance. Attemion then 
turns to the literature on hedging with commodity derivatives. Finally, the work by 
Miranda and Glauber which deals with both topKS is examined. 
Crop Insurance Literature 
Federal Crop Insurance has received a significant amoum of attemk)n fivm 
economists. In general, the literature has concentrated on two subjects. The first is 
the effect of insurance on the wel&re of the insured producer. The second is the 
efTea various pricing and structural schemes can have on the insurer and on the 
insured particularly in terms of moral hazard and adverse selectran results. A survey 
of this literature folk)ws. 
Skees and Reed (1986) examined the premium structure of the Federal Crop 
Insurance program based on individual producers' Actual Productk>n History (APH). 
Their main concern was the effect the premium-determinatk)n process has on the 
level of adverse selectun. When higher-risk producers are charged the same 
premium as k)wer-risk producers, the policy will tend to attract those with higher 
levels of risk and drive away those who have less to gain from buying the insurance. 
If rates are then adjusted (raised) to reflect the average, those with less variance in 
their productnn have even greater disincentive to purchase insurance. 
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The "theoretical premium" is equal to the expected loss in bushels times 
commodity price. Assuming a normal distribution governs crop yields (so that mean 
and variance are all that are needed to find expected loss), Skees and Reed 
demonstrate that unless the coefficiem of variation (CV) is the same for all producers, 
the theoretical premium will differ among producers. If standard deviation is held 
constant, it is shown that the theoretical premium fiUls as expected yield rises. 
The authors note, however, that while Federal Crop Insurance rates had 
recently begun to be adjusted for difierent APH yields (previously they had been 
based on the average for the area where the producer was located), APH average 
yields are not the same as the mathematically expected value for yields. The fkn that 
the FCIC did not adjust APH yields for any trend, "means that fiumers with positive 
yield trends are not able to purchase as much protection as is implied because APH 
yield is a biased estimate of expected yield," since producers are aUowed to purchase 
protection on, at most, 75% of their APH yield. 
The authors also raised concerns about individual rates based on the mean of a 
small sample of annual yields for the individual producer. This means that 
individuals with the same average APH values will pay the same premium even 
though they may have very diffisrent variation in yields. If equal APH averages do 
not imply the same CV across producers, this causes an adverse selection problem 
since farmers with very inconsistent yields will have greater incemive to purchase 
insurance than will those with production that is more reliable. Of course, if the CV 
is similar for fvms with equal expected yields, this would tend to support the practice 
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of basing premiums on average APH yields. 
Using form level com and soybean data, they first test for the existence of a 
positive trend in yields and whether the trend is the same for all producers within a 
state (data for Illinois and Kentucky farms are used). Positive trends are found. The 
hypothesis of equal trends among &rms within a region is not rejected. Adjusting the 
data for productivity changes, another regression is then run for each region with 
standard deviation as the dependem variable and average (or expected) yield as the 
independem. The "hypothesis that standard deviation is independent of expected 
yield cannot be rejected...." When CV is similarly tested, evidence is found that this 
tends to decline as expeaed yield increases. A test for normality of fium yields 
generates uncertain results with normality being rejected for a substantial minority of 
the producers. Skees and Reed conclude that, while it woukl be preferable to include 
the CV directly into the premium functk)n, if only average APH yield is used, there is 
evidence to support premium reductk)ns as yields increase. The measure of APH 
yield shoukl, however, be adjusted for changes in productivity to obtain a more 
realistic estimate of expected yield. 
This problem was further investigated later by Goodwin (1994). In his study, 
Goodwin questnns the assertfon that there is a consistently strong relatk)nship 
between average yields and the CV. Even if it is true that the CV tends to decrease as 
average yield increases, use of this tendency for rating policies will not likely 
eliminate the adverse selectbn problem because there wiU certainly exist high-yield, 
high variance operatuns which have more incentive to purchase insurance. There 
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will also be low-yield, low-variance producers whose expected loss (or theoretical 
premium) is much less than the premium calculated based on the low-yield, high-CV 
assumption. 
Goodwin investigates the relation between average and standard deviation 
using a much larger data set of Kansas farms which are not all insurance purchasers 
(Skees and Reed use data from Federal Crop Insurance purchasers). Running 
separate regressions for each of eight crops (four commodities each divided into 
dryland and irrigated land), six are found to have significant relation between yield 
and standard deviation. In some cases the relation is positive. In others, it is 
negative. For all eight crops, the regression equation has very low explanatory 
power. 
The data is then tested for the existence of adverse selection. The decision to 
purchase or not to purchase crop insurance is known for a portk>n of Goodwin's data 
set. CV was found to be higher for those who partkipated in FCI but the null 
hypothesis of equal CV coukl be rejected for only two of the four crops. Next, 
expected losses are calculated for participants and non-participants and are compared 
to estimated FCI premiums. For both groups, the average of expected k>sses are 
greater than estimated FCI premiums for all four crops. In three of the four cases, 
average expected losses of participants were greater than the average fosses for non-
partkipams with two of the three being significant. He concludes by advocating the 
direct use of the CV or of other observable fiictors which might be good indicators of 
variability for premium rate setting. 
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As a solution to adverse selection and moral hazard problems, there was 
frequently discussed a policy in which indemnities would be based on a large area 
where a fluin exists. Because there would be little moral hazard problem, there would 
be no need for a high deductible as there is under MPCI based on individual APH 
yields. 
Halcrow (1949) is credited by others as being the first to suggest an area-yield 
scheme. The idea was investigated again by Miranda in a 1991 article. Miranda 
began by assuming that individual yields are of the form 
y, 
where variables with subscripts are particular to individual producers and those 
without are those associated with the area. The y's are random yield variables, the 
^'s are the associated yield means, e is a stochastic variable with mean zero, and 3 is 
equal to the covariance of individual and area yield divided by the variance of the 
area yield. Assuming that indemnities, n, are paid when area yield is less than a 
certain ''critical yield," it is shown that risk reduction for the individual is determined 
by his individual value for |). It is not necessarily true, however, that area-yield 
insurance will be risk reducing for all producers. Risk reductk>n increases with 
correlatmn between the individual and area yields and increases as variance of 
individual yields increases. Specifically, the value of risk-reduction is equal to 
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Variance of the indemnity is denoted by eri- If the producer is able to choose any 
coverage level (a scaling factor for premiums and indemnities), the risk-minimizing 
coverage level is equal to 
JL 
2A • 
In addition, it is demonstrated that this optimal coverage level will be greater than one 
for some producers. 
Miranda then examined the level of protection offered by a policy in which 
indemnities and premiums were based on the yield of all producers in the area. He 
proceeded by decomposing an individual film's total production risk into systemic 
and nonsystemic components. The systemic portk)n represents Actors such as area 
temperature and rainfiill which affect area producers in a common manner. The 
nonsystemic portnn consists of those fiurtors such as one's own productk)n practices 
which influence only the individual producer. Miranda found that area-yield 
insurance with bw deductible, which protects an individual against only the systemic 
risk, provkles a greater level of proteamn against total risk than does 7S% coverage 
of APH yield. This assumes that producers may choose any positive level of 
coverage under the area-yield scheme. 
Mahul (1999) examined the optimal design of an area-yield policy in the form 
of a utility maximizatk>n problem. As in Miranda (1991) the difference in individual 
yield fix>m its mean is equal to the sum of a muhiple (beta) times the difference in 
area yield and its mean and a stochastic term with mean zero and uncorrelated with 
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yields. A general structure for the policy is specified: indemnities are a function of 
area yields and premiums depend on expected indemnities. It is shown that when an 
indemnity is paid, the amount is linear with respect to area yield. Assuming the 
farmer's beta is positive, the indemnity will equal this beta times the short&ll in yield 
(or zero if the area yield is greater than the critical yield). This means that for the 
producer with a beta greater than one, the optimal policy will indemnify by more than 
one bushel for each bushel reduction in yields below the critical yield. It is also 
shown that the critical yield is equal to the maximum area yield if the policy is 
actuarially fiur and is less than the maximum if the premium is greater than expected 
indemnities. If the insurance purchaser is constrained to a certain value in the 
coverage parameter, under constant absolute risk aversk}n the optimal critical yield 
will increase as the coverage constraint is k>wered. 
The klea of area-yield insurance was implemented in the 1994 crop year. 
Skees, Black, and Barnett (1997) describe the methods used to determine rates for the 
policy that was named the Group Risk Plan (GRP). The area currently used for GRP 
Is the individual county in which the operatran exists. Limits are placed on the range 
of coverage levels purchasers may choose. The authors emphasize that area-yield 
insurance can only serve to reduce risk for the individual where a significant poitk>n 
of total risk is systemic in nature. 
There have recently become available policies which concentrate on producer 
revenues rather than on yields. Currently existing policies that guarantee revenue 
levels are Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), Revenue Assurance (RA), and Income 
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Protection (IP) with CRC currently obtaining the largest premium revenues of the 
three. 
Potential benefits of a revenue insurance scheme are examined in Hennessy, 
Babcock, and Hayes (1997). It is first demonstrated that insurance which guarantees 
a fixed level of revenue is less costly to the provider than any separate guarantees of 
price and quantity which achieves a like revenue. It is then shown that insuring the 
revenue of a group of crops ("portfolk>" revenue insurance) is less costly than 
insuring the revenues of each individual crop. 
ImpUcatrans for government cost and producer welfue are then tested using a 
simulatwn where the subject is a producer of com and soybeans who exhibits CARA 
utility. Two levels of risk aversk}n are examined, as are four different insurance 
schemes. The four scenarios are the 1990 fium program, no insurance, form-level 
revenue insurance, and county-level revenue insurance. Within the latter two 
scenarios, both crop-specific and portfoUo insurance are tested each at 7S% of 
expected revenue guarantee and at the 100% level. Yields and prices are random 
variables. Acreage is permitted to be aUocated between the two crops to maximize 
expected utility. 
Under all scenarios the expected utility-maximizing aUocatbn of acreage 
between the two crops is an equal divisk>n. Farm-level revenue insurance with a 75% 
revenue guarantee resuhs in mild producer welftre reductk)n in terms of certainty 
equivalents and great reduauns in government expenses compared to the results 
under the 1990 form program. With a 100% guarantee, govemmem costs are slightly 
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higher than they are under the 1990 program but producer welfve is considerably 
greater. Compared to the "no program" ahemative, each dollar of government 
expenditure under the 1990 program increases fiuiner welfare by less than one dollar. 
The revenue insurance policies in all cases increase wel&re by more than govemmem 
expenditures. 
Prior to this, Turvey and Amanor-Boadu (1989) discussed the pricing of such 
a policy. In order to rate revenue insurance premiums, it is important to have an 
understanding of the distribution of revenue. Testing various crop prices, yields, and 
revenues for normality produces conflicting resuhs. The authors suggest that 
revenues may be either approximately normally distributed or it may be the case that 
revenue distributions may be positively skewed. They therefore offer two different 
models as providing bounds on the actuarially fair premiuno. The first is based on a 
model devetoped by Bolts and Boles in 19S7 which assumes that revenues are 
distributed normally. The second is based on the Black-Scholes optk>n prking model 
which, for this use, must assume crop revenues are distributed lognormally. 
Using county-level yield and price data, the crop allocatran necessary to 
achieve given levels of expected income and the associated standard deviatrans which 
resuh are calculated under the two differem distributk)n assumptrans. Per-acre 
premiums are then calculated for the various expected income levels and six different 
coverage levels. The crop insurance model and the Black-Scholes model yield 
significantly different premiums. Premiums are considerably higher with the normal 
distributk)n of revenue. This makes intuitive sense as it woukl seem that k>w revenue 
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results would be much less likely If they are governed by a positively skewed 
lognormal distribution. 
Stokes, Nayda, and English (1997) criticize the use of the Black>Scholes 
formula for rating revenue insurance in part for the assumptwn of lognormal revenue. 
In addition, "[t]he assumption of the existence of a riskless hedge poftfolk), long in 
gross revenues and put options written against the revenue is tenuous at best. This is 
because the Black-Scholes model would require the producer to continuously update 
this portfoUo (by buying and selling &rm gross revenue)...to maintain a riskless 
positk)n." Since this cannot be done,. .the no-arbitrage conditk>n required... is 
vk>lated." They develop a model in which premiums and maximum coverage are 
determined by a moving average of individual productk>a The model is used 
together with county-level data to generate actuarially fair premium rates for revenue 
Insurance. This model results in premiums inversely related to expected gross 
revenue in contrast to results obtained by Turvey and Amanor-Boadu. 
Hedging Literature 
The abundant literature on the use of futures contracts by producers to hedge 
risk began with McKinnon's work in 1967. Using variance of income as a measure 
of risk, McKinnon showed the positk>n a farmer shoukl take in the futures market to 
minimize risk for a given expected produak)n level and given futures prices. In his 
analysis he assunted normally distributed productwn levels and prices. The results 
indicate that the optimal forward sale increases as output variance increases and 
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varies inversely with the variance of price. Unless either the correlation between 
output and price is nonnegative or the variance of output is zero (i.e. output is a 
deterministic variable), the optimal hedge will be less than the amount of the expected 
output In addition, as the correlation between price and output becomes more 
negative, the amount of the optimal hedge decreases. 
A large number of articles fbUowed McKinnon's work putting more structure 
on the problem. Collins (1997) categorizes the types of studies which make up the 
hedging literature. In the main, these can be characterized by two avenues of inquiry. 
One of these is the risk-minimizing area of investigatwn. Studies that All imo this 
category target hedge ratk)s which minimize the variance of net returns. Collins cites 
Lence and Hayes (1994) as an example. 
In the Lence and Hayes article, it is noted in that work that minimum variance 
hedge (MVH) ratns are generally computed as if there is no uncertainty with regard 
to parameters. Given that data sets used in these computatrans are sample data, there 
must be some level of uncertainty about any parameter estimate. If the hedging 
activity is undertaken by a risk-averse individual, then uncertainty about the 
components of the variance-minimizing hedge ratk) shoukl itself affect the ratk>. 
The authors first review the derivatk>n of the MVH ratk) under the assumptran 
that parameters are known with certainty. Emphasized is the fiKt that these 
parameters generally are not known with certainty but researchers usually proceed as 
though they were. The result is the standard one thai the MVH ratk) is equal to the 
covariance of spot and futures prices divided by the variance of futures prices. 
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The problem of uncertainty in parameters (the functional form of the pdf of 
prices being assumed known) is attacked using Bayesian tools. After mathematically 
defining the objective of finding the MVH ratk> given the additwnal uncertainties, 
MVH is analyzed for an agent desiring to hedge a cash position in soybeans. The 
ratk) is calculated for vartous prior estimates of spot-futures correlatk)n coefficients 
using point estimates for all other variables. Three di£ferent levels of confidence are 
considered for the prior knowledge. As the prior estimate of correlatk)n increases, the 
MVH ratk) increases as might be expeaed. Confidence level in the prior seems to 
have the potential of having dramatic effect on the MVH ratk>, lower confidence 
causing the MVH to be considerably lower than it wouU be under typical point 
estimatk)n. 
The second avenue idemified by Collins pursues an optimal hedge by 
maximizing a producer's expected utility functwn which contains returns and a 
measure of risk as arguments. The position undertaken by agents in these models is 
generally given by an equation vrith a hedging component and a speculative 
componem. Lapan and Moschini (1994) analyzed the problem from the point of view 
of the producer who &ces risk from both price and output (as dkl McKinnon) and, in 
additk>n, faces basis risk. Lapan and Moschini initially make assumptfons regarding 
risk attitudes (Constant Absolute Risk Aversk)n) and the distributran of the random 
variables (bivariate normal) in order to obtain a solution in the form of an equatran 
which has a speculative component based on perceived bias in futures prices and a 
hedging component. Optimal futures positnns are estimated using soybean 
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production for regions of Iowa assuming various levels of assuming various levels of 
risk aversk)n and different harvest dates. Results depend somewhat on the level of 
risk aversion and rather less on the harvest date. The robustness of these results is 
tested by use of a Monte Cark) simulation using differem distributional and utility 
specifications (tognormality and Constant Relative Risk Aversk}a). The results hokl 
up fiurly well under the different specificatrons. 
Collins himself departs fix>m these two areas of emphasis which have 
investigated what agents shoukl do and pursues a model which explains observed 
behavior in participatran or lack of participatk)n in commodity derivatives markets. 
He writes that a positive model of hedging shoukl be able to simulate four different 
observed behaviors. First, some agents do not hedge. Others hedge completely. 
Those who hedge incompletely will increase their hedge if the volatility of the spot 
price increases. Agents who use an incomplete hedge will also increase their hedge 
when their debt increase. 
While acknowledging that most of the literature in hedging has not had a 
positive emphasis but rather has sought to solve optimizatksn problems, he evaluates 
various models for their ability to explain the observed behavk>r of various agents 
with regard to hedging in futures markets. Models which derive the risk-minimizing 
hedge may be appropriate descriptk)ns of what an arbitrageur does when he is k)ng in 
the spot nnaricet and short the futures but do not simulate behavwr of fiumers or 
intermediate users of commodities who are usually either partially hedged or do not 
use the futures market at all. Utility-maximizing models also fiUl short of the 
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conditions set by Collins. It is possible to obtain a no-hedge solution if by chance the 
hedging component happens to exactly equal the speculative component. These also 
emulate the behavior of the agent who hedges completely if the agent is modeled with 
infinite aversion toward risk. These conditions, however, are not intuitively 
appealing. 
Collins uses a two-period model where the objective is to maximize expected 
wealth in the second period subject to the likelihood that weahh falls bek)w a certain 
level, d, is no larger than a certain probability, a. If d = a = 0, then if the worst 
possible commodhy price will not drive total assets bek>w liabilities, the producer has 
no reason to sell his crop forward. (It is assumed that expected spot prices are greater 
than futures prices). If this is not the case, the producer will hedge ''such that [he] 
will just avert bankruptcy** under the worst-case scenario. Thus, a producer will 
generally not hedge in the futures market if the expected spot price is greater than the 
futures price. The exceptton occurs for the producer who carries a high level of debt. 
If the level of debt is high enough, cash prkes couki conceivably be sufficiently low 
for debt to exceed equity in the operatk>n at the end of the crop year. The model is 
also applicable to the arbitrageur who maintains a complete hedge in any transactk)n 
since "[a] true arbitrage transactk>n requires no equity," and any toss could therefore 
reduce total equity to a negative figure. 
The development of contracts on official NASS yield estimates for certain 
crops and areas has led to another area of study within the field. These contracts can 
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be used as imperfect substitutes for crop insurance for the producer. Vukina, Li, and 
Holthausen (1996) examined the way these might be used in conjunction with 
conmiodity price contracts to hedge risk. A mean-variance utility functfon is 
assumed which aUows a solution to be obtained for optimal price and yield futures 
posttk>ns. The authors show the versk)n of these equatk)ns that minimize the variance 
of profit as in McKinnon (1967). The derived solution for the utility-maximizing 
positk)ns in the price and futures markets contain four terms each: a term for price 
hedging, a term for yield hedging, a speculative component for price, and a 
speculative componem for yield. The risk minimizing positk)ns is shown to be equal 
to the utility-maximizing positions without the speculative componems. With the 
given structure, the authors next show the conditions under which the existence of 
yield contracts will significantly reduce variance of profit when only price futures 
exist. In short, the yield upon which the yield contract is based shoukl not have too 
high a variance. In general, however, not all risk can be eliminated even assuming no 
price or yield basis risk. 
Synthesis 
In a 1997 article, Miranda and Glauber demonstrate the potential benefit to the 
crop insurance industry of a market for area-yield contraas. Private insurers take 
advamage of the law of large numbers insuring many parties against unlikely 
independent evems but, in the case of agricukural productmn, "[t]he lack of stochastic 
independence among individual yields defeats insurer efforts to pool crop toss risk 
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among fiums, causing crop insurers to bear substantially higher risk per unit of 
premium than other property liability and business insurers." Therefore, without 
reinsurance crop insurance would have to charge premiums that would drive a great 
number of purchasers from the market. 
Miranda and Glauber use CV of indemnities as a measure of risk. County* 
level and &rm-level data are detrended using a quadratic regresswn equatk>n of state-
level yields. A regressbn equatk)n for each &rm is estimated using adjusted county 
yield as the independent variable. A simulatk)n is then run by selecting a crop year at 
random and then generating farm yields using the regressran equatk)ns and random 
draws for the error terms. Indemnities are then calculated and totaled for ten 
insurance companies. Risk levels range from 0.67 to 1.30. These levels are 
compared to CV levels of O.OS to 0.1S in other lines of insurance. The authors 
estimate that crop insurers take on between 22 and SO times the risk they wouM if 
yields were independent. 
Miranda and Glauber also investigate the possibility of using area-yield 
contracts as tools for reinsuring crop insurance policies first assuming that such 
contracts are available only for the entire U.S. productwn area and then for every 
individual state. A simulatk)n is run assuming optimal hedging under each of these 
two scenarios and under a third scenario assuming each insurer reinsures with the 
FCIC's current Standard Reinsurance Agreement placing all policies in the 
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Commercial Fund.* FCIC reinsurance significantly reduces risk to the insurers (CV 
ranges fiom 0.26 to 0.35). Availability of national yield contracts further reduces 
variability for nine of the ten largest crop insurers (CV ranges from 0.20 to 0.42). 
The existence of yield option contraas for all producing states reduces the CV of 
indenmities for all ten insurers to levels seen in other lines of the insurance industry 
which exist without government involvement (0.07-0.16). 
' Policies in the Commercial Fund leave the insurer with the largest amount of 
premium revenues and with the greatest responsibility for indemnities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
This chapter will cover the methods used in constructing the simulation. It 
begins with a summary of the path which leads to FCIC returns on reinsurance 
activities. From here the discussion turns to the details starting with the probability 
distribution used to simulate county yields. This entails seleaion of the distribution 
family and the estimation of parameters. An overview of the crop insurance policies 
demonstrates that most indenmities resuh from shott&lU in ^um yields and it is 
therefore necessary to simulate yields at the fiurn level in addition to those of the 
counties. This portion also incorporates calibration of the model such that expected 
loss ratios conform to assumptions. The paragraphs which follow motivate the 
importance of correlation levels among the sources of risk. The means of 
incorporating correlation within the model is then explained. Obtaining from 
indemnities the FCIC*s fiiumcial obligations to insurers necessitates an examination 
of the Standard Reinsurance Agreement. The implementation of the particulars of the 
SRA concludes the chapter. 
The Simulation Model 
The first objective of this study is to determine the value at risk of the FCIC*s 
reinsurance obligatk>ns. It is achieved by a Monte Cark) simulatk>n in which draws 
for yields are made and indemnities computed based on these draws. The simulatun 
is run on a spreadsheet with the use of a software add-in by the Palisade Corporatran 
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called @Risk. This software permits the user to designate probability distributions 
and the relevaiit parameters according to which random draws will be made. The 
method used here is to first make a draw fix)m a uniform distribution with limits zero 
and one. This draw can be viewed as represeming a probability. A draw for a yield 
value is made by using this probability value in the inverse of the yield distribution 
functwn. After yields are determined for an iteration, indemnities are computed 
based on the particulars of the various policies. Using the specifications elaborated in 
the Standard Reinsurance Agreement, the FCIC's share of revenues and expenses are 
then tallied. 
County Yields 
Accounting for Changes in Productivity 
The first step is to assign a distributk)n function for county yields. This 
requires the use of data on county-level production. A difficulty in determining the 
probability distribution function for yields lies in the fiict that the function almost 
certainly changes each year. Productk>n levels for a given year can be viewed as the 
resuh of a draw from a probability distributioa However, since productnn 
possibilities change each year, the draw for next year's productran level must be made 
from a different distributk)n functioa The annual county yields recorded by the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service are therefore generated each from a different 
distribuibn and are not immediately useful for estimating the 1997 distribution 
functwn. Productivity changes over the years to an extent such that a typical yield in 
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one particular year would be quite unlikely in another year. In using historical data, 
one must take into account the fiict that technological and other changes have altered 
the production possibilities. 
With this in mind, an effort is made to adjust the data for changes in 
produaivity. This adjustment can be made by identiiying the trend in yields. As the 
desire is merely to isolate a general trend line and not to explain every annual change, 
only simple linear regressions are investigated. 
One might consider identifying a single trend to adjust all yield data for 
productivity. Alternatively, it coukl be argued that the trend is not the same 
throughout the natnn and that it woukl be proper to investigate the specific trend in 
each state or in each county. The objective here is to bring historical yields up to a 
level which reflect the 1997 produaion possibility levels while maintaining the 
influence of good and poor growing conditions in the data. Using national data to 
identify the trend limits the influences of local weather conditions on the regression. 
1^ for example, there were a few years of very poor conditk>ns in Iowa, a regressed 
trend of Iowa data might produce detrend indexes which remove some of the effects 
of weather rather than removing the effects of technotogical growth As the U.S. is 
internally a &ee>trade economy, technology available in one pan of the nation is 
generally available in all other parts. Therefore, natk)nal yields are used to obtain a 
single trend line for the entire natk)n. (The effect of using county-specific trends is 
investigated in the appendix). The form used is 
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>nO',)=A + A^+^, 
where y represents U.S. yield, t is a time index represeming the crop year, e is a 
random disturbance, and the P*s are parameters to be estimated. Use of this form 
suggests that productivity increases at a constant proportion each year. The estimated 
parameters for the three crops is given in table 1. 
Table 1. Yield versus time regression results. 
Intercept Time parameter 
Com: 4.5276 0.01803 0.4302 
(169.1) (5.051) 
Soybeans: 3.422 0.01453 0.6143 
(194.1) (6.183) 
Wheat: 3.4158 0.00875 0.4417 
(223.1) (4.448) 
Using the estimated equations, a prediction is made for the 1997 crop year for 
each crop. This expected yield for 1997 is then used with the expeaed yields for ail 
other years to compute an index used to detrend the county-level observations. That 
/, = yvs<r\ {yinj' The historical county yields are all multiplied by the 
corresponding index so as to obtain 26 1997*equivalent yield observations. 
In light of this method of adjusting for changes in productivity, an additional 
comment might be made in regard to the model selected for detrending the yield data. 
With a natural log regression, the implication is that the trend increases by a constant 
rate. The objective is to identify the trend. It is not argued here that the logarithmic 
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regression is necessarily the best explanation of changes in yields. It must be kept in 
mind, however, that the purpose of the regression in this case is to determine the 
productivity adjustment factors to use with the county data. More complex models 
which provide a better fit will generate productivity adjustment fiictors which reduce 
the variance in the adjusted data. Since the uhimate objective is analysis of risk, 
paths which may understate risk shoukl be avokled. An alternative where a perfixt fit 
for the national yields is assumed is considered in the appendbc. 
The Functk)nal Form of the Distributk)n 
It was deckled to simulate county yields by drawing from the beta fiunity of 
distributwns. An advantage in the beta distributk>n is that the values of the 
parameters can be set so that there will be a negative, positive, or no skew to the 
distributk)a Skewness in yields has been klentified (Gallagher 1987, Ramirez 1997) 
and is particularly important for this study in which insurance paymems resuh from 
lower-than-average yields. As a means of capturing potential skewness, the beta 
distributton has been used to model the behavk)r of yields in various studies (Nelson 
and Preckel 1989, Babcock and Hennessy 1996). In a recent article. Just and 
Weninger (1999) raised concerns regarding the methods others have used to reject 
normality in the distributbn of yields. Because the beta distributnn can take on 
vark)us forms of skewness and kurtosis, it is useful here because the shape can be 
determined by the data and by the estimator rather than by assumptbn. The beta 
distributran has the density functk)n 
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f ( y )  =  i—i fi— where mm ^ y ^ Max 
ripWiq) (A/ar-min)'*'"' 
where min and Max represent the limits of the range in which the random variable y 
may fiiil. r() represents the gamma function and p and q are parameters which will 
influence the shape of the density function. 
Estimating the Parameters of the Distribution Function 
Following Babcock, Hayes, and Hart (1996), the parameters p and q are 
estimated for each county using the method of moments equations 
2 
P, = 
Maxj -min / ^ I-
M, -mm. 
Max, - min, ^ (A/ax/-min/) 
M -mm. 
Max, -min. 
R, = ' /i,-min, _ A-min. 
^A/ox,-min,^ A/ox,-min, ^ 
o-/ 
(A/ox,-min,)' -1-P. 
found in Johnson and Kotz (1970). The i subscripts are added to represent counties 0, 
1,2, ... n. 
In order to compute the values for p and q for the beta distribution, it is 
necessary to determine the values of all variables in the two equations above. 
Standard deviation and mean can be estimated from the productivity*adjusted data for 
each county. The minimum value for yields is taken to be zero. The reasoning is that 
extreme conditions do actually have the potemial of eliminating all production within 
a certain area. It shouU be noted, however, that this does not necessarily imply that 
farm, county, or state yields will equal zero with any frequency. If the historical yield 
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data do not contain any instances of near-zero yields, then the parameters p and q 
generated &om this data will ensure that near-zero draws from this distribution will 
be very rare. This assertion holds up in simulation. Initial work in simulating com 
yields in Iowa coumies used the beta distribution with the minimum set at zero. In 
this work there were no cases of near-zero yields although the possibility for such 
yields, however slight, remains. In areas where much fewer acres are in productwn, 
where history has demonstrated thai such low yields are possible for entire counties, 
setting the minimum above zero woukl downplay the variability in produaton. 
Determining the upper limit for the distributk)n is handled in a difTerent 
manner (The foUowing draws heavily from suggestk)ns given by Sergk) Lence). The 
maximum value among a set of draws from a beta distributfon is certain to be less 
than the upper limit of the distributnn. The difference between the highest possible 
value and the maximum observed will depend on the parameters of the distribution 
and the number of draws made. If measured as a percentage, however, simulatk>ns 
indicate that the shortM between observed and potemial is not dependent on the 
upper limit of the distributfon when other parameters are fixed. 
To examine what is the likely shortfiUl, a simulatfon is run in which sets of 
twenty-six draws are made from beta distributk)ns with one thousand iteratk)ns. The 
number of draws corresponds to the number of years of county data available. The 
distributk>ns all have the same minimums and upper limits. They have different 
values for p and q. The values chosen for p and q are all between two and fifteen 
inclusive. This was the range observed in initial tests on the county data when these 
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parameters were estimated using the method of moments equations above and setting 
the upper limit of the distribution at values between 100% and 150% of the maximum 
observation in each county. In all cases the value for p is greater than the value for q 
but the difference between p and q is never more than seven. The result, then. Is one 
thousand observed maximums for each of the fifty-six sets of (p, q) parameter values. 
The shortfidl of each of these simulated maximums is computed as a 
percentage of the observed maximum. That is, the value computed is the percent by 
which the observed maximum among twenty-six observations would need to be 
increased in order for it to equal the upper limit of the distribution from which the 
draws were made. The mean shortfidi for each set of parameters is then computed. 
The next step is to use regression analysis. Higher values for p tend to move 
the concentration of observations to the right—closer to the upper limit of the 
range—for a given value of q. Higher values for q have the opposite effect for a 
given value of p. Thus, the shortfall should vary inversely with p and should increase 
with q. The relation appears not to be linear, however. A bit of experimentation 
fmds a least squares regression of the log of the mean shortfiill on the log of p and on 
the log of q to be a good predictor given the specification of the parameters. (It could 
be mentioned here that a simple linear regression of the shortfiUl on the values of p 
and q has high explanatory power—a high R-squared—but the logarithmic regression 
yields smaller prediction errors. See figures 1 and 2.) The estimated equation is 
ln( A/) = -2.5426 - 0.9442 ln(p)+1.7203 ln(^) 
(-56.61) (-36.49) (82.94) 
S 1.20 
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Figure 1. Average muhiplier needed to bring maximum observation to the distribution's upper limit. 
15 
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Figure 2. Average multiplier needed to bring maximum observation to the distribution's upper limit. 
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with t-statistics given below the parameter estimates. The R-squared value for the 
regression equation is equal to 0.9926. 
So there is now an equation from which the upper limit of the beta distribution 
can be estimated given the values for p, for q, and given the historical data. The 
difficulty which remains, however, is that the values for p and q are determined by 
the method of nx)ments equations in which the maximum is a parameter. The method 
of moments equations and the regression equation are all nonlinear ones sufficiently 
complex enough to make a solution to the system difficuh to find. Convergence, in 
this case is found by an iterative process. For the great majority of cases, a 
convergence is found yielding values of p and q within the range mentioned above 
and a value for the maximum of the range usually between 5% and 20% above the 
observed maximum. 
For a small number of cases, there is no convergence. For these instances, the 
difference in maximums is minimized. Beginning with the observed maximum, p and 
q are computed using the method of moments equations. These values are then used 
in the estimated regression to produce an estimated maximum. The estimated is 
compared to the observed maximum. If they are not equal, the observed maximum is 
increased and values computed again. So long as the difference is decreasing, the 
process continues. When the difference ceases to diminish, the increased value of the 
observed maximum is taken to be the upper limit of the distributk>n and the values for 
p and q which are derived from this upper limit are used as the parameters of the 
distributk>n. 
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The Insurance Programs 
Four insurance programs are examined here. Actual Production History 
(APH) catastrophic coverage and buy-up coverage are similar in their structures. 
Each guarantees a specific level of production which is based on a percentage of an 
average of the individual's previous production. Catastrophic coverage pays 
indemnities when yields fiUl below 50% of the average. In such a case, a payment is 
made to the producer in the amount of the yield shortfidl muhiplied by 60% of the 
FCIC expected price. Mathematically, the per acre indemnity is written 
indent = max(0,0.6 • P • (0.5 Y-y)) 
CAT 
where P is the FCIC expected price, Y is the FCIC expected yield, and y is the 
producer's yield realization. Note that under catastrophic coverage there is no 
indemnity paid unless the harvest yield is less than half the expected yield. Note also 
that the market price does not figure into the formula. It affects neither the annount of 
the indemnity nor the probability that an indemnity will be paid. 
Computation of indemnities for APH buy-up coverage is similar except the 
fixed parameters are replaced with choice variables. The producer is permitted to 
choose the level of yield protection and the price election within certain ranges: 
intern = msxiOfA • P-{B-Y-y)) 
where P, Y, and y are defined as before. The parameter A is the price election chosen 
by the producer and B is the yield coverage selected. The price election can be 
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chosen from a range of 0.6 to 1.0 in increments of O.OS. Coverage level can be O.S, 
0.65, or 0.75. 
The Group Risk Plan (GRP) is another alternative available to producers. 
GRP pays indemnities based on county yields. This may be an attractive option for 
producers who have had abnormally poor yields in their recent history which has 
driven down the guaramee. As the FCIC makes an assumptk)n of rather tow yields 
when a fiinner lacks produaion records, GRP may also be an attractive optk)n for a 
producer who has not kept records. In additton, since indemnity paymems are based 
on the yields of a large area which includes many producers, much of the moral 
hazard problem of typical insurance contracts is eliminated—individual producers 
have little control over county yields. Also, verification costs of Multiple Peril Crop 
Insurance is eliminated for the insurance company as indemnities are based on county 
yields reponed by NASS (Skees et al. 1997). 
The effectiveness of GRP depends on a positive correlation between the yield 
of the individual producer and the county yield. For producers whose yields are not 
highly correlated with that of the county, GRP is ineffeaive as an insurance tool. 
Indenmities for GRP are computed somewhat differently from indemnities for 
the APH policies. Using X to represent the expected county yield and x to represent 
the realized county yield, indenmities for GRP can be expressed as 
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Note here that the coverage level, C, does not define the upper limit of 
indemnification as it does under APH buy-up. In the unlikely event of a county yield 
of X = 0, per acre indemnities for those insured with GRP would be equal for all 
producers who have chosen the same value for the scaling fiurtor A regardless of their 
choice of coverage level C. This Is not true for realized county yields greater than 
zero. Under GRP the producer can select coverage levels between 0.7 and 0.9 in 
increments of O.OS. The scaling parameter A ("protection" level) must be between 
0.9 and 1.5 in incremems of O.OS. 
A recent addition to the policies available is Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC). 
This is a revenue protection product. A revenue guarantee is made based on 95% of 
futures price levels prior to planting (the base price) muhiplied by a fraction of the 
producer's expected yield. At harvest, futures prices are reexaidned. If futures 
prices have fiiUen, the revenue guarantee remains unadjusted. IC on the other hand, 
prices have risen, the higher values are used to compute the revenue guaramee. 
Indemnities for CRC can be stated as 
indem = max(0,0.95• max(5,H ) - B - Y -  H  y )  
CK 
where S and H are measures of the planting and harvest prices as defined by the CRC 
policy, Y and y are the expected and realized yields respectively and B is the 
coverage level selected by the purchaser. The measure of the planting price (or base 
price) is the average daily senlement price in the month prior to plaming of the 
contract of the month immediately following harvest. The harvest price is the 
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average daily settlement price in the harvest month of the contract of the month 
immediately following harvest. Coverage elections range from 0.5 to 0.7S in 
Increments ofO.OS. 
Calibratioa 
Calibrating Catastrophic Coverage 
The mechanism for generating county yields has been explained above. But, 
as seen in the above paragraphs, only one policy insures county yields and only a 
small portion of insurers' liability depends upon the Group Risk Plait The vast 
majority of indemnities resuh from shortftlls in individual producers' yields and 
revenues. Generating yields for each participant in the crop insurance programs 
wouU be an extremely burdensome task. Instead, since the county yield is merely an 
average yield of all productmn within the county, fium yields are assumed to be 
distributed around this mean. Nonrandom samples are then selected from the 
distribution of &rm yields. By drawing nonrandom samples it can be certain that 
certain points ak>ng the continuum of yields will be measured in each county and in 
each iteratfon. Since it is yields in the left hand tail which generate most indemnities 
it is important that these be represented consistently in each iteratk)n. 
Nonrandom draws are selected in the folk)wing manner. The participating 
farm acres are divided into deciles. The yield for each decile of farm acres is a 
percentage of the mean (county) yield. This percentage is assumed to be normally 
distributed and cemered at one. The percentage for the first decile, x, will be where 
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the value for x which satisfies the equation F(x)=l/I I where F(.) is the density 
function for the normally distributed variable x. For the second decile, the value will 
be the X which satisfies F(x)=2/11. This pattern continues up to the tenth decile 
where x satisfies F(x)=10/11. With probability levels chosen in this way, the 
probability for each decile is equal distance from the next decile's probability level. 
Thus the probability of the first decile is 0.091 above zero and is 0.091 less than the 
probability for the second decile. 
Since it has been assumed that the mean of x is one, what is needed to solve 
for X is the coefficient of variation of fiirm yields within each county. It is assumed 
that the FCIC has priced each policy such that the expected loss ratio (indemnities 
divided by premiums) equals one. Manipulation of the aforememioned coefBcient of 
variation will alter the loss ratio for each yield drawn for the county. Coefficient of 
variation is therefore chosen for each county such that the expected loss ratio for the 
APH catastrophic loss policies in that county equals one (Credit must be given to 
Bruce Babcock and Dermot Hayes who suggested this method). The calibrated 
coefTicient of variation determines each decile's yield in relation to the average for 
the county. If^ for example, the coefficient of variation is determined to be 0.2S, the 
lowest ten percent of the county acres will have a yield which is 66.6% of the county 
average. A coefficiem of variation of 0.5 means that the yield for these same acres 
will be 33.2% of the mean. Upper and lower limits are set at twice the mean and zero 
respectively. Recall that there are no choice variables with catastrophic coverage so 
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that there is only one value for the coefficient of variation that will satisfy the 
equality. 
In almost all cases, a figure for the coefficient of variation can be found to 
equate expected indemnities to premiums. For a small number of counties, no 
number can be found to satisfy the equality. When no coefficient of variation can be 
found to bring expected indemnities down to premiums, a figure of 0.1 is assigned. 
Reductions below this level have a negligible effect on loss ratios. For the cases of 
expected loss ratios below one for all coefficiems of variation, a value of 8.7S is used. 
Increases beyond this figure result in almost no increase in expected loss ratio. 
Investigationg Variability in the Distribution of Yields within a County 
Up to this point, the discussion has proceeded under the assumption that the 
coefficiem of variation of fiuin yields within a cc >nty is a ccnstam. While it is 
reasonable to assume that individual farm yields may be represented as being 
distributed about a county average, it is likely less plausible that this distribution 
remains the same year to year. Obviously, the mean of this distribution will change. 
The shape, it would seem, may also vary depending upon, among other factors, the 
effects of weather conditions. One can consider various weather patterns that would 
alter the deviation of individual yields from the average. Under drought conditions, 
for example, it may be the case that all producers are affected similarly and yields 
may have less deviation from the county average than is normally experienced. 
Alternatively, it may be the case that some production units experience very low 
yields while others are not severely affected. In this scenario the variance of yields 
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within the county will be high. During flood years, which can also drive average 
yields to low levels, some land may have extremely low yields while others, located 
on higher ground or further from overflowing banks, may not experience much of a 
decline in production. In such a case, the mean is low and the variance is high. 
Under fiivorable growing conditions it would also seem that superior results 
may be nearly universal or rather unevenly distributed. However, if the idea of an 
upper limit on productivity of land is accepted, then this has an implication for the 
distribution of yield values within a county. If the county yield is near its production 
possibility limit, it must be the case that individual units are near their own upper 
limit with very few exceptions. Therefore, the coefficient of variation must be rather 
small. If it were large then fields with yields fiv below their maximum would need to 
be offset by fields with yields above their maximum. This is obviously not possible 
assuming the premise is accepted. 
In order to investigate the hypothesis of a relation between average and CV, 
individual farm yield data is compared to county yields. The fivm-level data comes 
from FCIC records of APH participants. The data for com covers the crop years 
1983-1994. Using counties where there is data for at least 100 producers, the CV of 
yields within the county is calculated for each year. This figure is then divided by the 
average CV for that county across the series. The result is an index for each county 
for each year. If a long series of data were available, the CV index for year t could be 
compared to the county yield for year t to provide evidence for or against the 
hypothesis. However, since the series is short, combining the time-series with the 
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cross-sectional data may better demonstrate the behavior of CV when county yields 
change. 
Of course, each county has a different yield distribution. Therefore, rather 
than comparing a county's CV index for a particular year with the county yield for 
each year, an effort is made to place all county yields on a similar scale so that the 
low end of the scale is not dominated by counties with low expected yields and the 
high end is not exclusively populated by counties with high yield potential To do 
this, each county's (productivity-adjusted) yield for the years 1983-1994 is used in 
the estimated beta function for that county. This will produce a number between 0 
and 1 which is the value of the cumulative distribution function and can be interpreted 
as a probability value. Note that this is the reverse of the process by which yields are 
drawn in the model. 
A scatter diagram of the C V ratio versus the beta value appears to support the 
suggestion that there is an increase in CV when yields are low and that the dispersion 
of yields within a county is reduced when the county yield is high (see figure 3). In 
addition, the scatter of data points is visibly attenuated as the beta value increases. A 
regression is run with the form 
ta(Cra,) = a,+a,-6, 
where CVR is the ratio of the county's observed CV to its average CV, b is the value 
of the county's beta function, the a's are estimated parameters and e is a random 
error term. The estimated equation is given by 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 
Probability 
Figure 3. CV index versus the value of the beta function: com. 
0.8 1.0 
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lii(Cra) = 0.3983 - 0.8280 • h 
(23.62) (-31.75) 
with t-statistics given below estimated parameter values. The R-squared statistic for 
the regression equation is O.S 101. Since there appears to be heteroskedasticity 
present, a regression is run with the squared errors as the dependent variable and the 
beta value as the only independem variable. This returns the regression equation 
> 2 
e =0.1087-0.0792-6 
(12.86) (-6.06) 
with an R-squared statistic equal to 0.03657. Using the White test for 
heteroskedasticity, the R-squared statistic is muhiplied by 971, the number of 
observatk>ns. If the errors are homoskedastic, this statistic has a chi-squared 
distribution with one degree of freedom. In this case the value of the statists is 35.51 
so homoskedastKity can be rejected. 
The problem of heteroskedasticity is addressed by weighting the observations 
by the square root of the value of the second regressran equatton. Running the 
weighted least squares regresswn yields the estimated equation 
i:cra* = 1.3907-3.3074 A 
(22.48) (-34.58) 
where LCVR* is equal to the natural tog of the C V ratk) divided by the square root of 
the predicted squared error. The R-squared statistic for this equatton is 0.5527. 
When the dependent variable of this equatton is muhiplied by the weights used to 
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adjust the observations, the fitted equation is quite similar to the one obtained from 
the ordinary least squares regression. 
The static value for each county's CV of individual yields can now be 
replaced with a value which is multiplied by a random variable. The mean of the 
multiplier is determined by the weighted least squares equation for the CV ratio. The 
standard deviation of the muhiplier is given by the square root of the estimated 
equation for the squared errors. 
The scatter diagrams for soybeans and wheat appear similar to the one for 
com exhibiting downward trends and decreasing variance. Likewise the regression 
equations for these two crops are similar to those derived from the com data. The 
ordinary least squares regression for the soybean data is estimated as 
In(Cra) = 0.3473 - 0.9938 • b 
(18.99) (-27.41) 
with an R-squared statistic of 0.S079. The estimated equation for the wheat data is 
given by 
ln(Cra) = 0.3127-0.8279-6 
(18.06) (-26.02) 
with an R-squared value equal to 0.4101. Again, the squared residuals are regressed 
on the beta values to test for heteroskedasticity. The intercept and slope parameters 
for the soybean data are equal to 0.09S4 and -0.0619 respectively with t-statistics 
equal to 14.7S for the intercept and equal to -4.83 for the slope parameter. The chi-
squared statistic for the regressran equatk>n is equal to 22.66 permitting the null 
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hypothesis of homoskedastic residuals to be rejected. Adjusting the observations as 
done with the com data yields the WLS regression 
ICra* = 1.2520-3.9242-A 
(18.96) (-29.98) 
which has an R-squared statistic equal to 0.SS26. 
Using the same weighting process on the wheat data resuhs first in the 
estimated equation for the squared residuals with an intercept equal to 0.1048 and a 
slope parameter of-0.0S97. T-statistics are equal to 1 S.06 and -4.67 respectively. 
The high value for the chi-squared statistic (21.37) again indicates the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. The weighted least squares regression which foltows results in the 
estimated equation for the adjusted data given by 
Z,Cra* = 1.0745-3.0749-6 
(17.70) (-27.57) 
with an R-squared statistic equal to 0.4383. 
Specifying the Relation between each Decile and the County Average 
Incorporating all these resuhs and summarizing the process of determining 
yields within a county, the &rm acres each coumy has with catastrophic coverage is 
divided into ten equal parts. The ten divisions or deciles are ranked by their ex post 
yield realizatnns from worst to best. The yield for each decile is calculated as a 
percent of the county yield: 
> ' . = K r  
47 
where i = 1,2,..10 and Y is the realized county yield. Farm yields are distributed 
normally about the county yield. The percentage that is muhiplied by the county 
yield to obtain the decile's yield is given by 
r, =<D-'(i/ll,l,j) 
where O ' is the inverse of the normal probability distribution function, i/11 is the 
probability, and 1 is the mean. The variable s is the standard deviation in this 
equation and the coefficient of variation of &rm yields within the county. As 
discussed above, it appears that this number tends to have a lower mean and variance 
when growing conditions are favorable and a higher mean and variance under adverse 
growing conditions. These effects are incorporated by giving s the form 
J = J • ExpiQ) 
where J is a fixed value calibrated such that the county's expected loss ratio for APH 
catastrophic coverage is equal to one. Q is a normally distributed random variable 
with mean a, -t-a, • and variance The a's here are the WLS estimated 
parameters for the CV. The ys are the estimated parameters for the squared errors. 
The variable 6, in both equations is the correlated probability draw from the uniform 
distribution used in the county beta function to obtain the county's yield. Making 
substitutions, the yield for each decile is given by 
y, = K <D '(//11,1,J•£*/>(<<» '(/>,Of0 ^(r, +r, ^)")) 
where p is a probability draw from a uniform distribution with bounds zero and one 
and all other variables are as defined above. 
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Calibrating Buy-Up Coverage 
Having determined the manner for calibrating catastrophic coverage, buy-up 
coverage is considered next. APH buy-up is calibrated by adjusting price elections 
("A" in the above equation describing APH buy-up indemnities) and yield coverage 
levels (B). An attempt is first made to equate expected tosses to premiums by 
adjusting the price election and assuming a coverage level of 0.6S. If there is no price 
election within the permitted range (0.6 to 1.0) which will accomplish this, coverage 
level is changed to either the lower (O.S) or higher (0.75) level as necessary with price 
election then being adjusted to equate losses to premiums. In some instances, there 
are buy-up policies but no catastrophic coverage purchased within the county so that 
standard deviation has not been determined. When this is the case, a coverage level 
of 0.65 and a price election of 0.75 is chosen and standard deviation is selected so that 
expected buy-up loss ratio is one under these conditions. Sometimes, because of 
limits on the choice variables, the coverage levels needed to equate losses to 
premiums is in between those levels available (0.5,0.65,0.75). When this occurs, 
price elections are set at I and total indemnities are given by a linear combination of 
indenmities at the lower level and of indemnities at the higher leveL I.e. 
indent = x • indemi\, A) + (1 - JC) • indem(\, B.). Kjr tup ' KJT ' 
where x is a number between zero and one and the B's are each one of the three 
available coverage levels. The implicit assumption in such a case is that a certain 
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portion, x, of the acres in the county are insured at the first coverage level and the 
remaining acres are insured at the other coverage level. 
Calibrating Group Risk Plan 
GRP is handled in a similar manner. As with APH buy-up, there are two 
choice variables for GRP policies, the coverage variable and a scaling variable. 
Calibration begins by finding any value for the scaling fiictor within permitted bounds 
(0.9 to 1.5) which equates the expected loss ratio to one when coverage is at the 
highest level permitted, 0.9. If this cannot be accomplished, it is attempted at the next 
coverage level, 0.8S. This process is repeated until the premiums and losses are 
equated. As with, APH buy-up, it is sometimes necessary to use a linear combination 
of indenmities at two differem levels of coverage. 
The three preceding policy calibrations are handled by calculating yields at 
probability levels 0.001,0.002,..., 0.999, Indemnities are then figured for each 
probability level. Expected indenmity is assumed to be the average of these. The 
parameters are adjusted as described above until the mean of indenuiKies is equal to 
premiums. 
Calibrating Crop Revenue Coverage 
Calibration of CRC policies is handled in a different manner. The purchaser 
is permitted to select a coverage level between O.S and 0.75 in increments of 0.05. A 
simulation is run and indenmities calculated for each county at each level of 
coverage. Higher coverage levels result in higher indemnities when indemnities are 
paid. The mean of indemnities for each coverage level is computed and compared to 
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premiums. The coverage levels which result in mean indemnities Immediately above 
and immediately below premiums are used to represent the county's CRC policies. 
The linear combination of the indemnities from these two coverage levels which 
equates them to premiums is found. Again, the logic is that x percem of acres are 
covered at the first coverage level and the remaining (100-x) percent are at the other 
level. 
Systemic Risk 
The Effect of Systemic Risk on Indemnities 
One of the more importam challenges in making draws for county yields lies 
in imposing reasonable correlatran levels among the draws. The level of correlation 
among coumy yields will have dramatic effects on the shape of the indemnity 
distributk)n. Preliminary tests supported this as discussed bek>w. Dramalk; changes 
in indemnity statistics result when tow levels of correlatk>n are imposed compared to 
outcomes when high levels of correlatk)n are imposed. 
Yields being independem wcukl imply that high or tow yields observed in one 
coumy wouM provide no informatton about yields in another county. Likewise, if it 
were the case that indemnities are paid in one county this wouM reveal nothing about 
the likelihood that indemnities will be paid in the neighboring county. IC however, 
yields are positively correlated, as one wouU expect, this shouM increase the variance 
of total yield-based indemnities. The intuitton is that betow-average yields will tend 
to occur among counties in the same years. The resuh will be increased instances of 
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years when total indemnities are quite low and increased instances of years in which 
indemnities are quite high. This should serve to &tten the tails of the distribution. 
To examine the effect of correlation, indemnity levels for GRP are estimated 
for Iowa com using a spreadsheet simulation Again, the beta distribution is used to 
model county yields with parameter estimates obtained as described above. As the 
imerest here is an examination of correlation levels' effect on variability of returns, 
policy choice variables (coverage level and scale) were not calibrated but given 
constam values. A coverage of 0.9 and a protection level of 1.4 is used for all policy 
indemnities. Thus the mean value for indemnities is not expected to equal premiums 
at this poim but changes in the standard deviation and in the VAR as imposed 
correlation levels are altered will demonstrate the importance of imposing correlation 
on the simulations. 
The means by which correlation is imposed will be discussed in greater detail 
below. In short, the counties are separated into divisions and subdivisions based on 
geographic location within the state. Random draws are made each iteration to 
represent state, divisional, subdivisional, and county yields. Correlation is imposed 
between each sequential level of draws. That is, a certain correlation, r, is imposed 
between the state draw and the draw for each divisioa The value of r need not be the 
same for each division. Likewise, the draw for each subdivision is also assigned a 
correlation value, s, between the parent division and the subdivision. The same is 
done for each subdivision and the counties within that subdivision. For purposes of 
examining the asset correlation-indemnity variance relationship, three separate 
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correlations are tested. Three simulations are run. Each time, the selected correlation 
level is imposed at all geographic levels. 
Each simulation uses 5,000 iterations. The first level imposed is p = 0.1 
where p represents Spearman's rank correlation coefficient. At this level, the mean 
level of indemnities is S2.4 millioa Indemnities range from a low of $0.7 million to 
$5.0 million. The standard deviation of indemnities is equal to $0.58 million. VAR 
at the 5% level is $3.5 million. 
The second test uses a correlation of 0.5 at all levels. Under these conditions, 
the mean is unchanged but the range of results increases. The lowest result is $0.2 
million. The highest is $6.0 million. Standard deviation increases to $0.99 million. 
VAR (.05) is now $4.2 million. 
When a correlation of p = 0.9 is used, the measures again indicate increased 
risk while the mean remains at $2.4 millran. Indemnities now range from zero to 
$11.9 milUon. The standard deviation jumps to $2.56 millk>n. VAR at the 5% level 
also increases substantially-to $7.6 millk)n at this correlatk)n level. 
From these results it can be seen that large changes in the level of correlation 
imposed can resuh in sizable differences in risk. Since the FCIC's total obligatbns 
increase at increasing rates as indemnities rise, measures of the FCIC's risk may be 
even more sensitive to the correlatk>n level. 
Positive correlation among risks reduces diversiflcatk>n potential. In the crop 
insurance market, correlatran among indemnities is a result of correlatk>n among 
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yields. Therefore, it is important for the simulation to maintain an appropriate 
relationship among yield draws. 
Imposing Positive Correlation on Yield Draws 
Johnson and Tenenbein (1991) demonstrate a method of imposing correlation 
on draws from two marginal distribution functions using linear combinations of 
draws from the marginals. If it is desired that draws be made frtim two correlated 
distributions for random variables A and B, draws are first made from these two 
distributions for preliminary variables a and b. The variable A is then merely 
assigned a value equal to a. The variable B is computed as a function of a linear 
combination of a and b. B = h (c*a + (1 - c)*b). Johnson and Tenenbein give the 
specification for h(.) depending on the distributions from which A and B are drawn 
and give the values of c for the level of correlation between variables A and B. They 
do not discuss extensions beyond the bivariate case. Their method is used here in the 
following manner. 
A single draw is made from a uniform distribution with a range of zero to one 
which can be viewed as a probability level for the nation's com yields for a single 
year. This value is not directly transformed imo national yield. Its purpose is to 
permit the imposition of correlation on yield draws at the county level Probability 
statistics are drawn for each state included in the simulation. The linear combination 
method is used to impose correlation between the national and each state's draw. The 
state is divided into a small number of divisions. A probability statistic is drawn for 
each of these divisions using the method of Johnson and Tenenbein to impose a level 
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of correlation between every division's draw and the draw for the state. Each 
division is divided into three to five subdivisions which also receive draws that are 
correlated with their parent division. Each subdivision contains a number of counties. 
Draws are made for the coumies to represent F(y) as described above but each of 
these draws are correlated with the draws for the parent subdivision. The effect is 
that all coumy yields are correlated with all other county yields but coumies share the 
highest levels of correlation with coumies in the same subdivision. Lower levels exist 
between coumies in the same division but dififerem subdivisions and still lower levels 
between counties in different divisions. 
The historical correlation levels between national, state, divisional, 
subdivisional, and county yields is examined using the productivity-adjusted yields, 
(since there is a general upward trend in yields, using the unadjusted figures would 
overstate correlation levels). In general, correlation levels are quite high in high-
production areas and vary widely in other areas. In a small number of instances 
where there are fewer years of data, a negative correlation level is computed. These 
cases are all in low-production counties where there are only a small numbers of acres 
going in and out of production over the years. Since it does not seem reasonable that 
negative correlation would actually exist, these are assigned a correlation level of 
zero in the simulation. 
A sununary of the process by which coumy yields are obtained is now in 
order. Each iteration begins with a draw for a variable, U, from a uniform 
distribution with limits of zero and one. This draw does not, by itself, determine the 
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national yield. Similar draws are made for each state. The draw for each state has 
correlation with the variable U imposed on it. Draws from uniform distributions are 
made for divisions within each state. Each of these is correlated with the draw for the 
state variable. Within each division, draws correlated with the divisional variables 
are made for subdivisions. Draws are again made from uniform distributions for each 
county. These have correlation imposed on each with the draws for the subdivision. 
The correlated county values from the uniform distributions, , are used as 
probability values to obtain county yields from the estimated beta distributions 
specific to each county. When the value of a random variable is desired and the 
probability is known, the inverse of the variable's distribution function is required. In 
this case, the Excel BETAINV function is used. 
Imposing Negative Correlation Between Yields and Prices 
Recall that CRC guarantees revenues rather than production. The peculiar 
mechanism by which the price component of the revenue guarantee is determined 
requires two price levels for each iteration. The first represents an average of futures 
prices early in the crop year. This price level is known by the insurer and by the 
producer before entering into the insurance agreemem. It is therefore not represented 
by a random variable but by a constam. The second is an average of the futures 
prices in the harvest month. The relevam data was assembled from the FCIC 
Managers Bulletins and calculated by Chad Hart of the Cemer for Agricultural and 
Rural Devek)pment at Iowa State University who made the figures available. 
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It is assumed that the natural log of prices is normally distributed. This is an 
assumption commonly made for commodity prices. The assumption of lognormality 
means that the distribution can be completely described by mean and standard 
deviation alone. These statistics were computed for the 1989-1998 data series and 
used as parameters for the price distributions. 
An important fiu:tor to maintain is the negative relationship between prices 
and quantity. Correlation coefficients are figured for productivity-adjusted yields and 
futures prices using the following formula: 
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In this formula Py represents futures prices at planting. Futures prices at harvest are 
represented by . The regression equation for national yields is used to calculate 
expected yield, y, and actual yield, y, is the productivity-adjusted historical yield. As 
predicted by economic theory, for each of the three crops the correlation between 
yields and harvest prices is negative. The values are -0.788 for com, -0.499 for 
soybeans, and -0.649 for wheat. 
These negative correlation levels are imposed on price draws and the national 
yield draws for the corresponding crops using the method of Johnson and Tenenbein 
as described above. While harvest price is obtained by a draw from a lognormal 
distribution, there is no single draw which represents national yield. National yield is 
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figured by summing total production and dividing by total acres after county yields 
have been calculated. Johnson and Tenenbein provide the formulas necessary for 
imposing correlation between two marginal distributions. While their method can 
still be used here, some experimentation is necessary to find the value of c which 
generates the desired level of correlation between price and national yield. Differem 
levels for c are used in multiple simulations umil the output price and yield data 
consistemly exhibit the correct level of negative correlation. The vahie for c that 
achieves this price-yield relationship is then used in the simulation model 
Standard Reinsurance Agreement 
The obligations of the FCIC are determined from indemnity levels as 
described in the Standard Reinsurance Agreement. Insurance companies are 
permitted to allocate each policy they write to one of three differem funds which 
determine the level of risk ceded to the FCIC and the level maintained by the insurer. 
In order to motivate the method by which the allocation is made for simulation 
purposes, a description of the SRA is given here. 
Attributes of the Three Reinsurance Funds 
As memioned above, loss ratios are calibrated to one in the simulation. This is 
equivalent to setting expected profit to zero. Rates are set so that producers fine 
policies that are actuarially &ir. This leaves little incentive for the insurer to sell 
policies. The Standard Reinsurance Agreement creates the incemive. The agreemem 
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is set up such that the greater portion of losses are borne by the FCIC. Under the 
SRA expected profits to the prinuvy insurer are positive. 
Under the SRA, there is also opportunity for the insurer to rid itself of its most 
undesirable policies and to attenuate the variance in the returns of the policies it 
keeps. Responsibility for undesirable policies can be ceded to the FCIC outright. 
Policies kept by the firm are designated to one of three reinsurance funds. 
The highest-risk policies which the insurance company elects to keep will be 
placed in the Assigned Risk Fund (ARF). A limit for each state is placed upon the 
total value of policies which can be placed in the ARF. Policies alk)cated here have 
the greater portwn of tosses covered by the FCIC. For k)ss ratk)s between 1.0 and 
1.6, the FCIC takes on 95% of the losses of all policies designated to the ARF. At 
higher k>ss ratk)s, the FCIC takes responsibility for an increasing portwn of the 
Indemnities. Likewise, when policies designated ARF return a profit, the lk)n's share 
is transferred to the FCIC. For k)wer levels of profits, where the k)ss ratk) for ARF 
policies lies between 0.65 and 1.0, the firm retains 15% of the difference between 
premiums and indemnities. At the most extreme, should there be no indemnities, 
only 7.6*/« of the gain is retained by the insurer. 
Policies which have k>wer levels of risk may be allocated to the Devek>pment 
Fund (DF) for the state. Unlike the ARF, policies designated DF will be segregated 
by type into one of three categories: Fund C for APH catastrophic coverage, Fund R 
for policies like CRC which guarantee revenues rather than productk>n level, and 
Fund B for all other policies such as APH buy-up coverage and GRP. The insurer 
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will be responsible for a greater portion of any losses among the policies designated 
DF. Again, examining loss ratios between 1.0 and 1.6, the FCIC is responsible for 
75% of the losses for the B and C funds and for 70% of the losses in the R fund. As 
with ARF, the govemmem assumes responsibility for an increasing share of losses at 
higher loss ratios. In exchange for taking on a higher Icv'el of responsibilities for 
losses, the primary insurer is entitled to greater portbns of any profits that accrue. 
When indemnities range from 65% up to 100% of premiums, the firm keeps 60% of 
profits for DF policies in B fund or in R fund and keeps 45% of the profits fix)m the 
catastrophic (C) coverage policies. ShouU a situatran where there were no 
indemnities ever arise, the B and R funds woukl yield 31.5 cents to the insurer for 
every dollar of premium revenue. Policies in the C fund leave the insurer with 
22.25% of the profit if there are no indemnities paid. 
The third designatk)n is the Commercial Fund (CF). The insurer will 
designate policies CF which the firm views as posing the least amoum risk to the firm 
and/or stand to yield the greatest profits. Like policies designated DF, those in the 
Commercial Fund are divided imo catastrophic, revenue, and other policy groups. 
Looking at losses which reach up to 60% of premiums within the group (i.e. loss 
ratk)s up to 1.6), the FCIC is responsible for half the difference in indemnities and 
premiums for policies in the B and C funds and for 43% of the losses in the R fund. 
As with the ARF and DF, FCIC responsibilities increase as tosses move beyond this 
range. In the event of profits, CF policies in the B and R funds yield 94% of the gain 
to the primary insurer when the loss ratk> is between 0.65 and 1.0 while those in the C 
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fund yield 75% of their profit to the finn. The maximum potential for CF policies is 
48.9% of premiums for B and R funds and 37.75% of the premium in C fund. 
Allocation of Policies to Reinsurance Funds 
For the simulation, policies are allocated to funds according to levels of risk. 
1997 data on total premium allocation among the reinsurance funds was obtained 
from the RMA. This data presents the allocation in premium dollars to each of the 
CF, DF, and ARF for every state. In general, states which account for very high 
levels of crop production have a large portion of policies designated CF by insurers. 
Other states have varying allocations to the three funds. The allocations seen in the 
data are mimicked by state in the simulatk)n. This is accomplished by ranking the 
policies in each state by the standard deviation of the loss ratk>. (This is obtained for 
each policy during calibratun.) Beginning with the policies with the highest standard 
deviation, policies are designated ARF until the proportk)n of the sum of premiums so 
designated to the sum of all premiums in the state reaches the percentage of 
premiums designated ARF in the RMA data. This is then repeated for CF policies 
except that the process begins with the policies having the lowest standard deviatk>n 
of loss ratk>s. All policies yet to be designated are then assigned to DF. There are a 
small number of policies which can not be calibrated such that the expected toss ratio 
is one within the choice ranges defined within the policies. Any policies which have 
an expected k)ss ratk) above one, the insurer cedes to the FCIC. 
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CHAPTER4 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
The value of the resuhs depend upon the validity of the simulation model. If 
the model is incapable of replicating real world yield-indemnity combinations, there 
is no reason to trust the simulated reinsurance costs. The simulated indemnity 
payments can be compared to the yield-indemnity combinations that have occurred in 
the past. CRC, GRP, and Catastrophic coverage unfortunately have very short 
histories with only four years of results. APH Buy-up coverage has a longer history 
and comparisons are therefore made for indemnities under this program. 
There are, however, problems with using APH Buy-up for comparison as 
well. The program has changed over the years in premium structure and in 
participation levels. Subsidies and other incemives have not remained fixed for 
farmers. It appears that actuarial soundness has in general improved over time. Thus, 
it must be remembered when comparing per acre indemnities time series data that 
different acres are involved in the experiment each year. As discussed in the review 
of the crop insurance literature, if there were more extensive adverse selection 
problems in the earlier years of the data series, this will make the likelihood of high 
average indemnities more predominant in the series. An indemnity level seen in one 
of the earlier years may not be realistic in a simulation which replicates the current 
program. 
62 
At least two adjustments can be made to make comparisons of historical and 
simulated data better. The first is to use per acre indemnity comparisons rather than 
total indemnity comparisons. The main reason for this is because of large differences 
in participating acres in various years. The second is to account for the changes that 
are made in the FCIC expected price. For each year, 1986-1998, the historical 
indemnity is divided by that year's expected price and then muhiplied by the 1997 
expected price. The adjusted per acre indemnities for each crop are then plotted with 
the simulated indemnities against yields. In all cases the historical points appear 
within the bounds of the simulated data (see figures 4-6). 
An additional point is woith mentioning prior to examination of simulation 
results. Subsidies account for a significant portion of the govemmem's costs in the 
crop insurance program. In all discussions up to this point, analysis has proceeded 
without regard for sources of premium revenue. When premiums are greater than 
indemnities, part to the insurance company's gain is transferred to the FCIC as 
outlined by the SRA. This is not, however, a profit to the FCIC. A large portion of 
the premiums paid to the insurers are actually paid by the FCIC. In all simulation 
results there are no cases where a positive return from the reinsurance business 
conducted by the FCIC comes up to the value of the premium subsidy paid by the 
FCIC. 
The FCIC also pays an administration and operations expense (A&O) subsidy 
to the insurer for policies sold. For APH buy-up policies, the insurance company 
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receives a payment equal to 27% of the premiums. For GRP the subsidy is 25%. For 
CRC it is 23.25%. No AAO subsidy is paid for APH catastrophic coverage. 
As these t^vo subsidies depend on demand by producers and are not affected 
by yields or harvest prices, they are not considered in the simulations. They can, 
however, be calculated and added to simulated results of the reinsurance business to 
obtain a measure of total cost to the government (less operating costs). Premium 
subsidies are included in the FCIC simunary of business data. A&O subsidies are 
calculated using the subsidy rates mentioned in the previous paragraph and the 
premium amounts for each policy given in the summary of business data. The 
subsidy total is given with the results for each crop. Since these subsidies are 
unaffected by yields and harvest prices, their inclusion merely shifts the distributions 
horizontally. Thus, the mean, minimum, maximum, and VAR statistics would all be 
reduced by the same value. Standard deviation of returns is unaffected. 
In a simulation of2,500 iterations, the expected value for the FCIC is a net 
outflow of S36.3 million from reinsuring the com crop. A net outflow occurs 40.5% 
of the time. The minimum and maximum values among the results are -SI ,383.8 
million and +$277.7 million. Standard deviation of returns is equal to $295.5 million. 
The value at risk (VAR) at the 5% level is -$633.8 million. The VAR at the 10% 
level is -$487.2 millioa The total premium subsidy for the com crop for the included 
insurance programs is $202.3 million. The A&O subsidy is calculated to be $98.3 
million. Taking these into account, the minimum, mean, and maximum retum values 
become -$1,684.4 million, -$336.9 millk)n, and -$22.8 millfon respectively. The 
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VAR figures at the 5% and 10% levels &11 to -$934.4 million and -$787,8 million 
respectively. 
The results for reinsuring soybeans are similar although on a somewhat 
smaller scale. The expected value for this crop is a net outflow of $24.6 million for 
the FCIC in its capacity as reinsurer. Outflows are greater than inflows in 42.2% of 
all iterations. Results range from a minimum of -$l ,078.8 million to a maximum gain 
of $221.1 millioa The standard deviation of returns is equal to $227.7 million. The 
VAR at the S% level is -$498.6 million. The figure for the 10% level is -$344.3 
million. The premium subsidy for the soybean crop is $141.5 million. The A&O 
subsidy is $56.6 million. Inclusion of these bring the minimum, mean, and maximum 
net returns to -$1,276.9 million, -$222.7 million, and $23.0 million respectively. 
VAR (.05) falls to -$696.7 million. VAR (.10) fiiUs to -$542.4 million. 
The mean in the case of wheat is an expected loss to the FCIC of $17.6 
million. In a majority of cases (50.6%), the expenses to the FCIC are greater than 
revenues from reinsurance activities. The results have a range with the limits smaller 
than those of the other two crops (-$524.9 million, $190.8million). The standard 
deviation of returns is equal to $111.8 million. VAR for wheat reinsurance at the 5% 
level is -$226.2 million. At the 10% level the VAR is -$171.5 million. Inclusion of 
the premium subsidy ($151.2 million) and of the A&O subsidy ($71.2 million) bring 
the minimum, mean, and maximum to -$747.3 million, -$240.0 million, and -$31.6 
million respectively. VAR (.05) becomes -$448.6 million. VAR at the 10% level 
falls to -$393.9 million. 
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The second portion of this study is to investigate the hedging potential of area 
yield and commodity price contracts for the crop insurance reinsurer. In order to do 
this, an addition is made to the simulation making national yield an output of each 
iteration. This figure is merely the sum of the production for all coumies divided by 
ail acres in productioa Note that these must also include acres not insured. 
Hedging Corn Reinsnnince Risk 
With this additional yield figure as an output, the relationship between yields 
and reinsurance cost per acre can be examined. Analysis will proceed on a scale of 
dollars per acre. A scatter diagram of the FCIC cost for com graphed against the U.S. 
com yield shows a trend starting with yield near 75 bushels per acre and net cost near 
$30 per acre (see figure 7). The worst-case poim has a yield of 86.7 bushels/acre and 
a cost of S28.62 per acre. From here, the trend appears to decline at a decreasing rate 
until net reinsurance costs become negative, with positive rettims above $S and yields 
reaching almost ISO bushels per acre. While the trend is obvious even to the naked 
eye, there is also obvraus variation in returns at every yield. Instances of positive net 
costs can be noted at all yield levels. There are cases in which the FCIC reaps a 
positive return even when yields fiill as low as 94 bushels/acre. 
The effiect of hedging with yield futures contracts is first investigated. These 
contracts do currently exist for com and are traded on the Chicago Board of Trade 
with a slightly different measure of yield than used here. The existing contracts are 
based on NASS yield estimates of harvested acres. The analysis used here assumes 
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that contracts are available based on planted acres. It is assumed that contracts are 
purchased &r enough in advance so that they are priced at their unconditional 
expected value. The mean value of com yields is 117.6 bushels per acre. It will be 
assumed that it is at this value that the reinsurer takes its position in the futures 
market. 
As noted above, a diagram of reinsurance costs versus national yields reveals 
a downward trend as shouki be expected. Therefore an of&etting positk)n would be 
one in which declining yields return increasing fuiancial gains. This is the case for a 
short positk>n in com yield futures. What remains is to determine the size of the short 
positk)n. A trendline can be construaed by regressing costs on yields. As the naked 
SRA positk)n of the reinsurer has a skjpe which appears to decrease at a decreasing 
rate, a linear trendline is not the best summary of the data. As a contract in the 
futures market has a linear payoff however, the linear regresswn gives a good 
indication of the posttk)n which can be offset by taking a position in yield futures. 
The sk>pe of the regressran line is about -$0.26. This means that over the range of the 
sample per acre cost will fall by about $0.26 for every one bushel per acre decrease in 
com yields. The ofiGKtting positk>n woukl there for be one which returns $0.26 for 
every unit decrease in com yields. 
Assuming that the short positk>n is entered at the unrestricted expected value 
of 117.6 bushels per acre, the expected return of the contracts will be zero. Over the 
range of simulatkin yields, however, the return ranges fix>m a toss of $7.89 at the 
highest yield to a gain of $10.70 at the k>west yield. The standard deviatbn of returns 
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is S5.12. Adding the return from shorting com yield futures to the return from 
reinsuring com policies gives the net position. 
To the extent that the short reduces deviations from the mean of costs, the 
futures position is an effective hedge. The expected net cost is unchanged from the 
unhedged position of the SRA ($0.75). Compared to the original, standard deviation 
of costs is reduced considerably ($6.11 vs. $3.34). The maximum is reduced in 
magnitude from $28.62 to $20.64—still significant but improved from the naked 
position. The minimum net cost is actually increased by the short position rising 
from a net gain of $5.74 to $8.14. VAR at the 5% level is reduced in absolute terms 
from $13.11 to $6.58. The figure for the 10% level falls fit)m$10.08 to $4.44. 
A scatter diagram of the net costs reveals a trend which appears to be 
parabolic and convex to the x-axis (see figure 8). The trough of the pattern appears to 
be between yields of 95 and 105 bushels per acre. As with the unhedged costs, the 
dispersion of costs appears to decrease as yields increase. When compared to the 
diagram of the original costs, the benefits of the hedge is apparent (see also figure 9). 
A great many instances of cost above the maximum and below the minimum of the 
net position can be found on the diagram representing reinsurance cost without 
hedging instruments. The tradeoff of hedging can also be seen in the diagram. The 
linear return of the short futures position, while reducing the level of losses for the 
lowest yields, also causes a large number of positive returns from the SRA to become 
net losses resulting from high yields. 
30 
20 
S 
8 10 
-10 
SP 
o 
o 
75 100 125 
Bu/acre 
Figure 8. Com reinsrance net costs with yield futures hedge. 
150 
10% 
8% 
I" 6% 
n 
s 
8 4% 
2% 
0% r 
0 5 
Figure 9. Value at risk: com reinsurance costs. 
Unhedged Reinsurance Costs 
Net Costs with Short Yield Futures Hedge 
15 20 
%lacre 
25 
74 
It may be the case that the reinsurer is only concerned with downside risk. If 
there is no great aversion for variance of costs so long as there are no traumatically 
high losses, it is possible that this may be achieved by holding put options on com 
yields. The put option will begin to return to the holder when yields fall bek>w the 
strike value. The return is linear over the range of yields below the strike so that each 
one bushel drop in per acre yields increases the payment to the holder of the option by 
a constant amount. Should the final yield be greater than the strike at settlement, the 
option expires with no value. The loss b this case is limited to the initial paymem for 
the purchase of the option. 
A strike value of 120 bushels per acre is selected as this is near the mean value 
of yields. Holding put optk)ns at this strike value will only attenuate losses which 
occur when yields fall bebw 120 bushels per acre. Again, to determine the 
investment necessary to ofGKt the losses, a linear simimary of the stope of the costs 
from the SRA must be figured. This time, however, only the slope of the trend below 
120 on the x-axis is estimated since the payoff of the optk)n will not af!ect results 
above this figure. 
The slope of the regressk>n is -S0.38. Thus, on average, for every one bushel 
drop in per acre yields bek)w 120, costs of the reinsurer are increased by about $0.38 
per acre. The offsetting put positmn will therefore return a like amount for a similar 
fall in yields. This means that the slope of the put positran must be -$0.38 over this 
range. Above this range the slope of the position will be zero. 
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An essential part of determining what the net position will be is knowing what 
the cost of the hedge will be in this case. It is assumed here that the market for these 
contracts is efficient and the cost of the opttons is equal to the expected return of 
holding the optbns. To do this the return for each of the 2,SOO simulated yields and 
the mean of these returns is computed. The formula for the settlement payment is 
niax(0, 120-y)*0.38 where y is the realized natk)nal com yield. The mean of these 
gross payoffs is $3.75 which is taken to be the cost of the contracts in an efficient 
market. The return of the optfons will not be positive until this cost is covered. This 
happens at a yield of about 110.25 bushels per acre. 
Again, the mean for the net is unchanged fix>m the unhedged mean cost 
(S0.75). The standard deviation is reduced from $6.11 to S3.17. Note that this 
reductron is only slightly greater than that seen with the short positran in yield 
futures. This is somewhat unexpected. Standard deviatmn here is a measure of 
dispersk)n about the mean. While the futures positfon is used as a tool for reducing 
this dispersfon, the put optfon is used only to reduce the downside risk. Also 
perplexing are the comparisons of the downside risk reductnn by the two 
Instruments. While the positk>n in yield puts does a better job of reducing standard 
deviatwn of costs, it appears that the futures positbn is better at suppressing 
downskle risk. VAR(.05) goes from $13.11 to $6.58 with the short positfon in the 
futures market and to $7.20 with the put contracts. The potential culprit here may be 
the high costs incurred in purchasing the yield puts ($3.75). One way of reducing this 
cost without increasing the downskle risk at low yiekls is for the reinsurer to 
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simuhaneously sell call options. With this strategy, up-front total expenditures on the 
hedge portfolio is reduced. This comes at the cost of potential losses if yields are 
high. The use of such a put-call combination is examined below. 
A scatter diagram of the net position compared to the unhedged shows points 
to the right of the strike value lowered vertically by the cost of the option (see figure 
10). Points to the left of the strike are moved vertically by an amount equal to the 
payoff of the opttons less the fixed cost of the opttons. Note that in some cases (yield 
> 110.25) the cost is greater than the payoff so that these points are lowered. As with 
the case with the futures hedge, the risk-reducing benefits are visible. 
While a great many positk)ns couU be examined depending on objectives and 
motivations, a single addition will be exptored for this crop before adding commodity 
price contracts to the analysis. It was noted earlier that the short positk>n in yield 
futures does a fiur job of reducing the measures of risk used here. It was further noted 
that part of the limitatnn is the fact that the return on the futures position is linear 
with respect to changes in yield whereas the position that needs to be hedged appears 
to be nonlinear with respect to yields. To some extent nonlinear hedge positk)ns can 
be constructed using optrans on fiitures. Adding a second contraa to the portfoUo 
may have the benefit of reducing total variatran if it targets the upper poTtk>n of the 
range of yields. 
The relevant contract for targeting costs where yields are above the strike is a 
call optk)n. This is because of the fiKt that returns for the call optk>n change only 
when the strike is exceeded. The ftct that costs are decreasing as yields increase 
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means that the ofi^ing position will be the sale of call options. This means that the 
reinsurer will owe the purchaser of the call options when yields rise above the strike 
value. What remains is to determine the amount of the sale. A regression of the 
points with yields above 120 bushels is run. The sununary slope is -$0.13 per bushel. 
The sale of contracts which reduces costs by this amount generates $0.93 in revenues. 
Therefore the net cost of the poitfolio of options is $2.82. The addition of the second 
contract reduces the standard deviation of costs to $3.12. VAR is likewise reduced to 
$6.63 at the S% level and to $4.13 at the 10% level A scatter diagram shows what 
appears to be a roughly horizontal trend—a significant change from the original 
positk)n determined by the SRA (see figures 11 and 12). 
It couM be hypothesized that traditranal derivative contracts on commodity 
prices have potential risk management uses for the reinsurer. Prke figures directly 
into the indemnity computation of one of the insurance products available to 
producers (CRC). Hedging only against tow yields therefore leaves the reinsurer 
exposed to potential losses due to price changes. In addition, there is a high negative 
correlation between price and yield. If one is primarily concerned about yield risk, 
one might conskler the use of price contracts as a substitute if yield contracts are not 
available. 
Assuming that only contracts on com prices are used to hedge reinsurer risk, 
separate regressk)ns are run on outcomes with harvest prices above and below $2.7S 
per bushel. This strike price is selected because it is near the expected prk;e of $2.73. 
Points on the low end of the price range have an estimated sk)pe of $9.62. For those 
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above the strike price, there is an estimated increase in cost of $12.03 for every dollar 
increase in the harvest price. Purchasmg the put contracts and writing the call options 
which offset these positions yields a net gain to the reinsurer of $2.25 (the put options 
cost less than the gain from selling the call options). Not surprisingly, the position in 
the commodity price derivatives is not as effective at reducing risk as is the position 
in the yield optk)ns (see figures 13 and 14). With the price options, standard 
deviatk)n is $4.74 compared to $6.11 with the naked position and $3.12 with the 
positk>n in yiekl contracts. VAR(.OS) is equal to $10.07, fiUling in between the 
unhedged and yield-hedged figures of $13.11 and $6.63. Likewise, the figure for the 
10% level which is $7.14 is better than the result with no hedge ($10.08) hut not as 
good as the result using yield contracts ($4.13). 
An initial glance at a scaner diagram of unhedged costs to the reinsurer 
plotted against the harvest price gives one the impression that costs to the reinsurer 
tend to increase as the harvest price increases. Closer inspectk)n, however, reveals 
what may be a dramatic change in the slope. While the costs to the reinsurer appear 
to generally increase as price increases, the increase becomes more pronounced as 
price rises above $2.75. If the effects of yield can be removed, it may even be the 
case that the sk)pe is negative for prices below $2.75. This pattern makes sense 
under certain conditbns. Examinatk)n of the indemnity functran for CRC illustrates 
the relatfon between indemnities and harvest price. The indemnity function can be 
written 
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/ = inju((U') 
where I is the per-acre indemnity level and I' is the difference in the guaranteed level 
of revenue per acre and the realized revenue per acre: 
r = R-R=cPy'-P'y. 
The guaranteed level of revenue is represented here by R while the realized 
revenue is given by R. The guarantee is the product of the selected coverage level, c, 
the price component, P, and the expected yield, y'. Realized revenue is calculated as 
the product of the commodity price at harvest, P'', and the realized yield, y. The 
price componem of the guarantee, P, is the larger of the expected price and the 
harvest price muhiplied by 0.95: 
P = 0.95 •max( ?•,/»*). 
The effect of changes in the harvest price can now be investigated. The 
condition for an indemnity to be paid while the harvest price is greater than or equal 
to the expected price can be given by 
/  = / '  = 0.95cP'y' -P'y>Q (4.1) 
and therefore, 
0.95c>'*->'>0 (4.2). 
Differentiating equation 4.1 with respect to harvest price gives 
8S 
Note that this can be signed positive since it is identical to condition 4.2. Therefore 
increases in harvest prices will increase Indemnities when an indemnity is being paid 
and harvest price is above the expected price. It follows that an increase in the 
harvest price under these conditions will increase the costs of the insurer and 
therefore will also increase the costs of the isinsurer. This somewhat counterintuitive 
outcome is due to the unique feature of the CRC contract in which the revenue 
guarantee is increased if harvest prices rise above the expected prices. Under the 
conditions above, increasing the harvest price raises the gtjaranteed revenue at a rate 
greater than the rise in the realized revenue. 
If indemnity payments are made when harvest prices are below expected 
prices, equation 4.1 is changed to 
/  = / '  = 0.95cP'y' -P' 'y>0 (4.3) 
where the expected price has now been substituted for the harvest price in the revenue 
guarantee portion of the equation. Differentiating equation 4.3 with respect to harvest 
price now yields 
dl _ dl' _ 
dP' dP" 
which is obviously negative assuming a nonzero yield. Therefore, increases in 
harvest prices will decrease indemnity payments as long as the harvest price does not 
move above the expected price. Again, it follows that returns to the insurer and to the 
reinsurer will increase as harvest price increases over this range. 
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Putting these two results together indicates that returns to the reinsurer should 
tend to decline as harvest price nuves away from the expected price. With this 
analysis, one would expect that the appropriate hedge combination would be a 
portfolio consisting of call purchases and put purchases with strike prices near the 
expected commodity price (a long straddle). The net effect of this hedge will be to 
reduce net returns when the harvest price is near the expected price and to increase 
returns when the harvest price moves away from the expectation. 
To examine the additional benefit of including commodity price contracts, the 
net return on the yield-hedged portfolio is used. A regression equation is first 
estimated for price-return combinations in which price is below $2.7S. (The expected 
price for the 1997 com CRC program is $2.73.) The slope of this line is -$2.14. 
Therefore, the ofbetting position wiU decrease retuns by -S2.14 per acre for every $ 1 
Increase in the harvest price of com. The regression equation for results with price 
above $2.75 per bushel has a slope of $2.41. The off^ing position increases returns 
by this amount for each dollar increase in the harvest price. 
It appears that the incorporation of price contracts into the hedge portfolio has 
very little effect on the distribution of results. The cost of the put-call combination 
with these slopes is $0.78. With their iiKlusion, the standard deviation is reduced 
only slightly to $3.07 compared to $3.12 when using yield options only. Value at risk 
falls from $6.63 to $6.58 at the S% level but moves from $4.13 to $4.17 at the 10% 
level (see figure 15). Looking at the range of outcomes, the minimum moves from a 
net gaia of $8.96 to $8.65 and the mtximum cost level fiUli from $18.61 to $18.08. 
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Histograms of net returns with and without hedging instruments in figures 16 
and 17 demonstrate two points. The first is that there is a wide variation in potential 
returns with small probabilities of very high costs. This shape of the density function 
is altered considerably when price and yield contracts are included in the portfolio 
(see figures 18 and 19). Where there was previously a long negative tail with a 
gradual increase and an abrupt end near the peak, there is with the hedge a density 
with a more compact look to it and rapklly decreasing positive and negative tails. 
The second point, however, is that there remains a substamial amount of variation in 
the returns. While the likelihood of the worst results is much reduced or even 
eliminated, the range appears no smaller that it was originally (in fiut, it is slightly 
greater). 
Hedging Soybean Reinsurance Risk 
A scatter diagram of the returns fivm the reinsurance activities with the 
soybean reveals a pattern similar to the one seen in the com crop (see figure 20). 
There is, of course, a difference in the ranges over the yield figures. The curvature of 
the trend also appears somewhat less pronounced. As with the com output, it appears 
that the heteroskedasticity in this series takes the form of decreasing variance as 
yields increase. The k>w end of the pattern begins with natranal yields just bek>w 30 
bushels per acre and costs to the reinsurer as high as $2S per acre. From there the 
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trend appears to decline at a decreasing rate to yields just under 48 bushels per acre 
and positive net returns above $S per acre. 
A short position in yield futures is again used to construct a hedge to the 
original position. As done for com, a simple linear regression is performed on the 
simulation results. The slope of the regression line is -$0.88. A hedge position is 
constructed with a short futures position having a slope equal to this regression and 
crossing the x-axis at the unrestricted expected yield of 39.7 bushels per acre. 
Plotting the net position reveals a change similar to the one for the first hedge 
construaion for com (see figure 21). The trend of the net position appears slightly 
parabolic with most cost results between -$5 and +$10 although a small number of 
points fall outside of this range. Analysis of sununary statistics shows an unchanged 
mean cost of $0.58 per acre. Standard deviation fiUls from $5.39 to $3.37. The VAR 
statistics decrease from $11.81 and $8.16 to $6.95 and $4.15 for the 5% and 10% 
levels respectively (see figure 22). 
Replacing the short futures position with a put purchase and a call sale results 
in some slight changes in these statistics. Selecting the strike value at 40 bushels per 
acre for both contraas, two separate regressions are run; one for all instances with 
yields below the strike and another for all with yields above the strike. The sk)pe for 
the lower end is -$ 1.16. The slope for the upper portk)n is -$0.51. The net cost of the 
contracts to eliminate these slopes is $ 1.60. The positk)n diagram of the option 
portfolio looks like the short positk>n in the futures market except that there is a kink 
at the strike value of 40. 
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The scatter diagram of the net position also has changes from the diagram of 
the net position with the futures short. The points representing the net returns look to 
have a generally horizontal trend with variations tending to remain in the range -SS to 
SIO with a small number of deviations outside of these bounds. The summary 
statistics are somewhat improved. Compared to the futures hedge, standard deviation 
is slightly lower at $3.29. VAR at the 5% level is somewhat decreased ($6.60) while 
it is also a bit better at the 10% level ($4.33). 
Usage of the more fimiiliar conunodity price options is also investigated here 
as it is with the position in the com market. The strike price for the optk)n contracts 
is at $6.95 per bushel-near the expected price of $6.97. Regresswn analysis on the 
unhedged returns yields a slope of $2.69 per dollar change in harvest prices bek)w the 
strike. The trend for the yield-hedged resuhs with harvest prices above $6.95 is 6.22. 
The initial net gain from taking the offsetting position is $2.41. The net effect is a 
moderate, though still visible, attenuatk)n of risk. Standard deviatk>n is reduced from 
$5.39 without hedging to $5.01 when the price contracts are included. The value at 
risk figures move from $11.81 and $8.16 to $10.90 and $7.52. The extreme points 
also move with the maximum cost figure falling from $25.56 to $23.06 and the 
minimum decreasing from -$5.24 to -$6.68 (see figure 23). 
When the use of price options in additk>n to the positk>n in yield optmns is 
investigated, the sign of the sk>pe of points below $6.95 changes to negative as is 
expected. The estimated slope of this portwn of the diagram is-$0.34. Forpoims 
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Figure 23. Soybean reinsurance net cost with price options. 
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above $6.95 the least squares regression estimates a slope of $2.91. The cost of the 
straddle is $0.39 per acre. The resuhs of purchasing the price puts and calls are 
ambiguous (see figure 24). There is a negligible reduction in standard deviation vis-
&-vis the position with yield contracts alone ($3.28 per acre versus $3.29 per acre) but 
the VAR figures are slightly worse ($6.67 versus $6.60) at the 5% level and 
unchanged at the 10% level ($4.33). 
Inspection of the change in the VAR graphs demonstrates the effectiveness of 
the various hedge instrument combinations (see figure 25). Usage of price options 
alone makes a small improvement in VAR. With the availability of yield options, 
which, target the source of risk more directly, risk is reduced more significamly. 
Adding price options to the yield hedge has an imperceptible effect on the VAR. 
Examinatk)n of the histograms and distributwn schedules of costs reinforce the 
results of the VAR graph (see figures 26-29). Hokling price and yield options 
transfers the frequency of extreme resuhs toward the mean. 
Hedging Wheat Reinsurance Risk 
A pk)t of the resuhs for the wheat simulatk)n has some similarities to the pk)t 
of returns for the other two crops. The scatter conforms to the other patterns in that 
the dispersion seems wide at the fower yield levels and attenuates as yields rise (see 
figure 30). One difference that is visible, however, is that the pattern of the wheat 
data shows considerably less curvature than is visible in the case for the pfots for the 
other two crops. In addhnn, the range of cost possibilhies appears to be much 
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Figure 24. Soybean rdnsurance net cost with price and yield options. 
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smaller for wheat. The panem begins with a small number of simulated observations 
having yields between 25 and 28 bushels per acre and net costs to the reinsurer from 
zero to $10. The trend then frills at what appears to be a nearly linear rate to yields 
just under 42 bushels per acre and negative costs (positive returns) nearing $4 per 
acre. 
Constructing a hedge with a short position in the yield fritures market is 
handled here in the same manner as previously. The summary slope of the naked 
position is found to be -$0.46 per acre. The short position which coumerbalances this 
nets a reduction in standard deviatk)n ($1.61 versus $2.21) and reduced VAR figures 
(from $4.47 to $3.44 at the 5% level; from $3.39 to $2.47 at the 10% level). As with 
the other crops, a visual inspection of the net positron appears to have a curve convex 
to the x-axis though it is a very subtle one for the wheat data. The bulk of 
observations &11 into the range of -$4 per acre to +$4 per acre (with some exceptions 
above this range; see figure 31). 
As done previously with soybeans, the benefits of permitting a kink in the line 
which describes the hedge positron is investigated here. The change in stopes is 
achieved by replacing the fiituivs contracts with a k)ng put positron and a shon call 
positron. The strike value chosen is at 34 bushels per acre which is near the mean 
yield. The regressron sk)pe for points to the left of this value is -$0.S6. The slope for 
the upper portron is -$0.4I. The subtlety of the difference in these sk)pes compared 
to the one for the futures hedge suggests that the benefits of aUowing the change in 
sk)pe may not be large. Indeed, the measures of risk used here are not greatly 
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Figure 31. Wheat reinsurance net cost with yield Aitures. 
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affected. Standard deviation &lis from $1.61 to $1.60. VAR(.OS) realizes a slight 
imprcvemern fidling from $3.44 to $3.40. VAR(. 10) declines from a value of $2.47 
to $2.44 (see figure 32). 
The potential benefit of price contracts is also examined with the wheat crop. 
The strike price for these contracts is selected at $4.00 which is close to the expected 
price of $3.99 per bushel. Regression on the lower-price results indicates a summary 
line with slope equal to $1.51. Analysis on the second portion of the data points 
yields a regression equation with slope equal to $0.84. The position in the options 
market which has sk)pes equal to these yields an up-front net gain of $0.61 per acre. 
The net effect of including the price contracts is inferior in terms of risk-reduction to 
the wheat portfolio which contains yield options as hedging instruments (see figure 
33). Standard deviation of returns to the reinsurer is reduced somewhat from $2.21 to 
$1.96. The VAR figure for the 5% level is a bit improved ($4.07 versus $4.47) while 
the figure for the 10% level is also improved ($3.39 versus $3.00). The maximum 
cost has gone from $10.37 to $8.97. The minimum cost to the reinsurer also &lls 
slightly moving from -$3.77 to -$3.93. 
The same strike price is used when considering the additmn of price contracts 
to the hedge using yield optrans. Using the yield-hedged returns as the dependem 
variable, the sk>pe of the k)wer portion of the scatter is estimated to be -$0.35. The 
estimate for the stope of the upper portk>n is equal to -$0.10. This sk)pe has a 
negative sign while a positive one is expected. It shoukl be noted that the t-statistic 
for this parameter estimate is not significam whereas all other skspe estimates which 
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Figure 33. Wheat reinsurance net cost with price options. 
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have been used to construct hedge positions for com, soybeans, and wheat have been 
significant without exception. This may be due, in part, to the fiu;t that of the three 
crops, wheat has both the smallest allocation of CRC policies both in terms of 
premium dollars (S49.3 million versus $82.5 million for soybeans and $137.9 million 
for com) and as a percentage of total crop premium dollars (1 S.7% versus 29.3% for 
soybeans and 30.3% for com). The benefit of using the hedge constructed from these 
parameter estimates is small and ambiguous(see figure 33). Compared to the results 
from using the yield hedge alone, standard deviation is unchanged ($1.60). VAR(.OS) 
is improved a small amount moving fix)m $3.40 to $3.37 but the figure for the 10% 
level is slightly worse rising from $2.44 to $2.49 (see figure 34). Inspection of the 
VAR schedules and the distribution diagrams indicate that the hedging instrumems 
are less effective for the wheat crop (see figures 35-39). 
Hedging Total Reinsurance Wak 
A final poim well worth investigating Is the usefiilness of the hedge positions 
on the total portfolio of the reinsurer. In so doing, care must be taken to include the 
correlation across the different crops. As the level of correlation among areas of 
production greatly affects the ranges and frequency of returns, so does the level of 
coirelation among the crops. 
Recall that for each crop a series of (yield, retum) points are generated. In 
this final simulation, each iteration draws one of these yield realizations all with equal 
likelihood and the corresponding retum is noted This time, however, the historical 
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Figure 34. Wheat reinsurance net cost with price and yield options. 
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correlation levels among the three crops is imposed not with a variation on the 
method of Johnson and Tenenbein but with the correlation matrix which the @Risk 
software makes available to the user. For each iteration, then, correlated draws are 
made for national crop yields and, since the rettims to the reinsurer are positively 
correlated with the yields, returns for each crop will also move together. 
These correlated returns are summed for each iteration to give the total return 
to the portfolio. The result is an expected cost of $0.56 per acre and extreme values 
of 14.26 and -$4.55. The standard deviation is S3.36. Value at risk is computed for 
the 5% and 10% levels. The values for these two statistics are $7.13 and $5.52. For 
each sum, then, the hedge positwn for each crop is added. The net cost is then 
cateulated with the hedge instruments included. The attenuatk)n in variability is 
noteworthy. While the mean is unchanged, the standard deviatk>n of returns is less 
than a half of what it was ($ 1.56). The VAR measures of risk are also reduced by 
large amounts (see figure 40). These are now $3.31 and $2.44 for the .05 and . 10 
levels respectively. 
A visual inspectk)n of the graphed resuhs with and without hedging 
instruments gives the impressk>n that the hedged distribution woukl be preferred by 
thie risk-averse reinsurer (see figures 41-44). Comparison of summary statistics 
reinforces showing reductfon in standard deviatk>n and VAR statistics reinforces this. 
A more rigorous investigation, however, wouM include the testing for stochastk; 
dominance. 
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The concept of first-order stochastic dominance involves the comparison of 
stochastic returns. One distribution has first-order stochastic dominance over another 
if it yields "unambiguously higher returns." A given distribution, G(), is said to first-
order stochastically dominate distribution H() if for every nondecreasing indirect 
utility fimction u(), it is the case that 
luix)dGix)^iuix)dHix). 
This is only the case when G(x) is greater than or equal to H(x) for all x (Mas-Colell 
etaL 199S). Superimposing the cumulative distribution figures of the hedged and 
unhedged returns reveals that the two functions cross. This coupled with the fiict that 
the two distributions have the same expected return indicates that neither distribution 
has first-order stochastic dominance over the other. 
It is possible for a distribution to have second-order stochastic dominance 
over another distribution even though they may have equal expected values. Second-
order stochastic domination of distribution GQ over distribution H() means that for 
every indirect utility function, u(), that is nondecreasing and concave, it is the case 
that 
In such a case, it can be said that distribution G() is a less risky alternative to H() 
(Mas-Colell et aL 199S). Another look at the superimposed graphs suggests that the 
hedged distributk>n may second-order stochastically dominate the unhedged 
distributton. The graph of the unhedged distributton begins above the hedged and is 
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then overtaken. There is a higher probability of the low returns with the unhedged 
distributioa 
A formal test of stochastic dominance using sample data from different 
distributions was developed by Gordon Anderson (1996). The output is first 
partitioned. The partitioning is arbitrary except that at least five observations should 
be in each partition. For these data, partitions are selected at returns of -$1 billion, 
-$800 million, -$600 million, -$400 million, -$200 million, 0, $200 million, $400 
million, and greater than $400 million. The proportion of the total number of 
observations in each partition is taken to be an estimate of the probability of a draw 
falling within that partitwn. 
Following Anderson's procedures to approximate integrals, the folk)wing 
matrices are defined: 
1 0 0 ... 0 
1 I 0 ... 0 
I r 
1 1 1 ... 1 
d, 0 0 
d|+d2 d} 0 
Ip ~ 0.5 di'^2 d2"Hl3 ds 
0 
0 
0 
di+d2 d2+d3 ds+di ... dk 
where the d. figures are the interval lengths. Using these definitk)ns, the existence of 
first-order stochastic dominance implies that all elements in the vector If (p*^ • p") is 
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less than or equal to zero where p" and p" are the vectors of estimated probabilities 
for the hedged and for the unhedged partitions of the respective distributions. 
Second-order stochastic dominance implies that all elements will be less than or equal 
to zero for the vector determined by If If ( p" - p" )• The calculations for these two 
vectors are 
1st 2nd 
-0.049 -0.247 
-0.086 -0.383 
-0.124 -0.593 
-0.152 -0.869 
-0.082 -1.103 
0.170 -1.015 
0.264 -0.581 
0.111 -0.206 
0.000 -0.067 
so first-order stochastic dominance is not indicated. Note that this is as expected 
since the mean returns from the two distributions are equal. Note further that second-
order stochastic dominance is implied so that further evidence is given that the 
distribution of the hedged returns is less risky than that of the returns without any 
hedge. 
The Standard Reinsurance agreement can be viewed as a derivative contract. 
Payments are made based on state loss ratios in each reinsurance fund which are in 
turn based on yields and futures prices. Option contracts are an exchange of a 
paymem for a commitment. The writer of an option receives a payment and agrees to 
make a payment to the purchaser under a set of contingencies. In effect the purchaser 
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is paying the seller to accept the purchaser's risk. Under some circumstances the 
optk>n contract will have a positive value at the delivery date. At worst, the contract 
will have a value of zero. Therefore, prior to the delivery date, the option will have 
some positive price. 
The FCIC, however, does not receive an up-front payment from the firms that 
it reinsures. While the SRA does not have a payofif schedule exactly like a put 
contract since the reinsurer sometimes receives payments at the end of the crop year, 
it is found here that the expected return to the FCIC is negative. The bias against the 
reinsurer in the SRA can be demonstrated with a diagram of loss ratk>s and reinsurer 
costs. There is not an exact relatranship between natk)nal k)ss ratk>s and the cost 
schedule. A scatter diagram of total loss ratk) and reinsurer cost does demonstrate, 
however, that knowing the value of the toss ratk) can give a very good indication of 
how much the payments will be and which party will be the net beneficiary. A linear 
trendline added to the diagram demonstrates that the relationship is not quite linear. 
Government net payments increase at an increasing rate as the loss ratk) rises (see 
figure 46). 
The expected net payoff to the insurance companies can be imerpreted as the 
fair market value of the contract That is, this is an amount that the insurers woukl be 
willing to pay in order to obtain the reinsurance services of the SRA. This figure, as 
has been menttoned, is S36.3 millton for the com crop, $24.6 millmn for soybeans, 
and $17.6 millton for wheat. For the three crops together the fidr market value is 
estimated to be $78.7 millk>iL 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
While the topic of crop insurance has received a significant amount of 
attention fix)m economists, there has been little attempt at quantifying the level of risk 
that has been accepted by the government in its role as reinsurer for this market. 
Research has gone instead into other worthwhile topics such as wel&re analysis, 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, and insurability. Academic inquiry has 
led to reform of policy structures and to the devek)pment of area-yield and revenue 
insurance products. Until the appearance of the 1997 article by Miranda and Glauber, 
however, there was little to be found on the subject of reinsuring crop insurance in the 
published literature. 
The first objective of this work was to determine the level of risk which is 
accepted by the FCIC when reinsuring crop insurance for com, wheat, and soybeans. 
This is accomplished by use of a Monte Carlo simulation in which correlated yields 
and prices are drawn and indemnities are then computed. Using the reinsurance 
obligations of the FCIC as described in the 1997 Standard Reinsurance Agreement, 
payments to and from the FCIC are calculated from indemnity levels. With this 
analysis, it is estimated that there is a five percent probability that at least $1 billion in 
reimbursements will need to be made to insurance companies based on results for 
these three crops abne. This is a number greater than the worst reinsurance year for 
the reinsurer, 1993, in which claims against the FCIC exceeded premiums for 
reinsurance by $822 millbn (GAO 1998). 
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Another important result is the derived value of the reinsurance services 
which are provided by the FCIC to the insurance companies. There is found to be a 
positive net transfer payment to the insurance industry due to the specifications of the 
SRA. In addition to the administrative and operations expense subsidy paid to 
insurance companies, there expected net transfer of $78.7 million. The actual 
transfer, of course, varies from year to year depending on indemnities and can 
sometimes be a net transfer from the industry to the government if indemnities are 
low enough. It should also be remembered that net transfers to firms in any year 
come in the form of reduced losses and not as increased profits. The figure of $78.7 
million includes only the value of reinsurance services. It does not include other 
costs and benefits associated with the SRA. While this figure is small compared to 
the potential losses under the worst-case scenarios, it should be acknowledged that 
this is a real cost to the government and it is a real benefit to the insurers. 
There are both systemic and nonsystemic components to crop insurance risk. 
As with other risky financial instruments, each portion of the insurer's portfolio is 
neither totally dependent nor totally independem of the other componems. If there 
were no correlatk>n, the insurer's risk could be managed by diversification alone. If 
the risk were completely systemic, derivatives markets coukl perfectly eliminate the 
uncertainty. 
The reinsurer's risk is mostly systemic. Obligatk>ns or profits increase at 
increasing rates as k)ss ratus naove away from one. In order for premiums and 
indemnities to deviate fiv from equality, indemnities must, for the most part, be 
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moving in the same direction. This is systemic risk. The net value of $78.7 million is 
more than just what the insurer's would be willing to pay for the reinsurance services 
of the SRA, it is what the competitive market woukl require to accept the insurers' 
systemic risk. 
The question of risk reduction for the reinsurer was also investigated. 
Assuming the existence of natu)nal yield contracts, various positk)ns in the market 
were examined for their potential to reduce the frequency and level of extremely 
negative results. While the level of risk reductran was found to be appreciable, the 
use of these contracts alone is clearly no panacea. While no assumptions have been 
made with regard to the risk attitudes of the FCIC, the movemem of the VAR figure 
at the five percent level from -SI billion to -$467.2 millu)n would likely be seen by a 
private reinsurer as significantly beneficial. 
The various results of this study shoukl be of interest for budgeting. In order 
to budget for a stochastic cost, it is necessary to know about the distributk)n of the 
cost variable. The output data of these simulations can be examined to determine the 
maximum amount that will be needed for reinsurance payments for any given level of 
confidence. Agricuhural policymakers can also make use of these results. If 
policymakers determine that, for example, too much of the risk burden is borne by 
either the FCIC or too much by the insurers, It is relatively easy to examine 
alternative structures for the SRA by altering the appropriate parameters and re-
simulating. It shoukl be kept in mind, however, what the simulatran model does not 
do. If for example one wishes to examine the effects of changes in the struaure of 
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one or more of the insurance programs, in addition to re-calibrating one must also 
determine in advance what changes this will make in premium revenues and number 
of acres participating. This is necessary because the simulation model does not make 
any predictbns with regard to demand for insurance. Participation is fixed at the 
1997 level. 
One of the more important assumptions that is made in the process of 
constructing the simulation model is that policies are actuarially fiur. This means not 
just that aggregate premiums are equal to aggregate expected indemnities but also that 
there is equality between premiums and expected indemnities at the level of the 
individual policy. This is almost certainly not the case for the actual crop insurance 
program as the current goal for the expected aggregate loss ratk) is 1.075 (GAO 
1998). As noted earlier, a significam share of the crop insurance literature has been 
devoted to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. An investigation into the 
effects of alternative assumptions regarding the actuarial properties of the policies 
requires an assumption for each individual policy and re-calibrating to reflect the 
assumptions. 
These are costs associated with analyzing ponfoUo risk analysis by 
simulatwn. For this particular problem, however, the labor-intensive nature of these 
costs compare fiivorably with the costs of using typical portfolk) risk analysis. The 
general estimatk)n of variance for the portfolk) in matrix notatun is given by w'£w 
where w is the vector of portfolk) weights and £ is the variance-covariance matrix of 
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the assets in the portfolio (Jorion 1997). An attempt to use this formula on the 
reinsurer's portfolio is met with significant difificulty. The components of the 
variance-covariance matrix are generally estimated using historical data. While there 
is some historical data on returns from the reinsurance activities of the FCC, it 
cannot be said that this is equivalent to having data on, say, stock prices. While a 
share of stock remains an equal share of a firm over time (assuming no splits), the 
reinsurance of policies in a particular state in one year is a different liability than the 
reinsurance for the same state in any other year. Not only will premiums be different 
for the state differ over time, but aUocatk>ns to reinsurance funds, structure of 
insurance programs, and the SRA itself may change. A calculatk)n of variance and 
covariance based on these data woukl be highly suspect. In addition, the above 
poitfoUo variance estimator assumes a normal distributk>n of returns. Simulatk)n 
results here do not appear to support this assumption for the currem structure of the 
SRA. The development of means to overcome these problems woukl be of high 
value if the benefits of the simulation method and the comparable ease and 
convenience of the single equatk)n method could be found in one approach. 
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APPENDIX 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In adjusting for changes in productivity regressions based on national yield 
data was used to detrend the data for all county yields. As with all choices, there are 
both costs and benefits to selecting this method. Previously mentioned arguments 
included the assumption that new innovations and new technologies can be adapted 
quickly throughout a free-trade economy. Furthermore, local disruptions will affect 
regressions on county data more severely causing greater disturbances in the indexes 
used to detrend the data. This is especially true for counties which have less data 
available. 
Some of the reasons in favor of using county-specific regressions to adjust the 
data should also be acknowledged. The most important of these is that counties 
probably in foct do have differing yield trends. This is not, however, likely due to 
differing rates of technobgy advances. It is more probable that some areas have 
marginal land falling out of produaion as opportunity costs rise thus raising the 
average yield for the county at a rate higher than the national trend. It is also possible 
that the more-productive land is being removed from crop production if, for example, 
the better land happens to be closer to an expanding urban area. The effect, in this 
case, woukl be to reduce the average yield growth for the area. 
Whether or not the selectk)n of a natk)nal trend versus county-specific trends 
makes a difference in the resuhs of this study is a topic worthy of investigatk>n. In 
order to do this, data for 2,638 corn-producing counties was used. The natural log of 
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the county yield is regressed on a simple time-trend variable as is done with the 
national yield in the main portion of this study. The explanatory power of these 
regression estimations is wide-ranging with some effectively explaining all variation 
in the county's yield (R-squared > 0.999) and others having virtually no explanatory 
power (R-squared <0.001). The simple average of the R-squared statistics is equal to 
0.276. Some of the regressions fit the data well only because there are very few data 
points. Despite this, eliminating all counties with fewer than ten years of data does 
not seem to alter the summary much. The elimination of these 187 coumies leaves a 
range of R-squared values from 0.000 to 0.942 which have an average of0.263. 
Among the regression equations, 295 (11.2%) have a negative slope. The 
average of the time parameters is 0.024. The values fall in a range of -0.741 to 0.S42 
but extreme values tend to be associated with counties will little data. Restricting 
attemion to instances where at least 10 years of data are available makes little change 
in the average slope but brings the extremes to -0.112 and 0.232. 
The regressk)n estimates are used to construa index numbers which are used 
to detrend the county data as was done with the natranal index numbers in the 
methodok)gy sectna In some cases the index numbers are clearly absurd. One 
county, for example, has an index number for 1972 of 759,336. Many other have 
index numbers which are near zero. All such cases appear to be a resuh of a lack of 
data. In general, when there is a suspiciously large or small index number for a 
particular year for a county, there is rarely any data present for that year which will be 
affected by the index number which has been generated. There is, for example, no 
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1972 yield value to multiply by 759,336 in the county which produced this index 
number. The existence of counties with numbers like these causes the average to be 
much higher than seems reasonable, however. The mean value for all 1972 index 
numbers is 300.3 (eliminating this one outlier brings the average down to a somewhat 
more reasonable 12.6). In general counties which have higher levels of production 
and, therefore, more data, the index numbers produced are more reasonable. 
Restricting attemion to counties in Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa, for example, gives an 
average 1972 index number of 1.40 with a range of 1.04 to 2.02. 
Parameters for the beta distributions which govern county yields are 
determined in the same manner as previously explained. Calibration is likewise 
handled using the methods in the original work. Correlation levels must be 
recakulated for yields. Simulation proceeds as before with 2SOO iteratk)ns. A 
comparison of the results for this simulation with those of the original simulatran is 
worth examining. 
It is not unexpected that the summary statistics for the price variable is little 
changed. The same distributk)n is used in both simulations so there is no reason to 
expect that the results would be different. The simulated yield figures do appear to 
differ with the mean yield for the second simulatwn being 1.63 bushels per acre 
greater than the mean yield for the first simulatran. While standard deviatran of 
yields is not too large, greater difference exists at the bw end of the distributran of 
yields. With the single-regressk)n simulation, five percent of all yields are below 
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84.1 bushels per acre. Under the county-specific regression, the five percent level is 
at 88.2 bushels per acre. 
As loss ratios are calibrated to equal one, the similarity in the means of the 
indemnity figures is logical. It is worth noting that the measures of dispersion are 
also not too dissimilar despite the &ct that no direct effort is made to arrive at this 
outcome. Estimated standard deviation of APH buy-up indemnities, for example, is 
Increased by 2.6% when the county-specific regression is used. The same figure for 
catastrophic coverage is reduced by 1.2%. The decrease is 6.9% for the small GRP 
program. The estimate for CRC increases by 1.2%. 
Of greater interest is the change in reinsurance costs. Using national yields to 
adjust for productivity changes in the simulation yields an expected loss of $36.3 
million to the reinsurer under the SRA. The estimation of the expected net transfer to 
the insurers is $34.8 million under the alternative specification. There is also a small 
change in the estimate of the standard deviation of returns to the reinsurer ($29S.S 
million versus $311.2 million). The VAR figures have also been ahered by the use of 
county-specific regressions. At the 5% level VAR moves from -$633.8 million down 
to -$661.7 million. The change in the 10% level is a decline from -$487.2 million to 
a figure of -$496.3 million. 
The regression model used in the study contained only a single independem 
variable, a time trend, to describe the trend of yields. This resuhed in R-squared 
statistics between 0.43 and 0.61. As stated in the text, the objective of this regression 
was not to identify the reason for variation in yields, but solely to identify the trend 
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over time. Use of a more complex model which would obtain a better fit of the data, 
would make changes in the output of the simulation. It was hypothesized that 
overfhting of the data would result in an understatement of risk. To investigate this, 
behavior of the output was analyzed assuming that a regressk)n model was used 
which fits the data perfectly. Since there are 26 data points, this couU be 
accomplished with a polynomial of order 25. While it woukl be difficult to justify 
this model theoretically, this can be viewed as an extreme assumptk>n which may 
help to idemify the robustness of the results with respect to choice of the regressran's 
functunal form. 
Rather than using expected yield for 1997 divided by expected yield for year t, 
a ratio of actual yields is used to create an index for each crop year. This index is 
then used in the same manner as described in chapter 3 to raise state, divisk)nal, 
subdivisk)nal, and county yields from previous years to 1997 levels. The remainder 
of the analysis proceeds exactly as previously. 
As with the county-specific regressk>ns, statistics for price are very similar to 
the original figures. The variability of national yields is less by 17% than that which 
appeared in the original simulatun as expected. Standard deviatnn, however, is 
slightly greater for indemnities for each of the four different insurance programs. 
Paradoxically, the standard deviatfon for reinsurance returns a bit (S%) smaller 
although the range of outcomes is greater. With the exception of the worst-case 
results, the similarity of the statistics for the returns to the reinsurer is notable. In 
summary, it can be sakl that while estimates are not completely immune to 
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specification, general conclusions hold up fiiirly well under the three alternatives 
examined here. 
Comparison of Simulation Results Using a Single Regmsion Equation, 
a Perfectly Fitted Regmsion, and County-Specific Regressions to Adjust 
Historical Yields for Changes in Productivity 
Summary statistics using a single regression 
price yield APH CAT GRP CRC SRA 
$/bushel bu/acre $100 million 
mean 2.50 117.6 2.484 0.672 0.066 1.357 -0.363 
St. dev. 0.36 19.8 2.306 0.678 0.107 1.295 2.955 
min 1.42 76.1 0.016 0.005 0 0.002 -13.838 
max 4.18 148.2 11.02 3.62 0.511 7.54 2.777 
VAIU.05) 1.97 84.1 7.017 2.052 0.312 3.944 -6.338 
VAR(.10) 2.07 88.0 6.039 1.675 0.247 3.31 -4.872 
Summary statistics using a perfectly fitted regression 
price yield APH CAT GRP CRC SRA 
S/bushel bu/acre $100 million 
mean 2.50 120.5 2.462 0.637 0.075 1.397 -0.339 
St. dev. 0.36 16.5 2.459 0.723 0.123 1.342 2.807 
min 1.59 87.6 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 -17.084 
max 4.07 148.5 13.425 4.598 0.589 8.684 2.479 
VAR(.05) 1.96 93.4 7.466 2.188 0.371 4.213 -6.360 
VAR(.10) 2.07 96.4 6.172 1.708 0.284 3.362 -4.253 
Summary statistics using county-specific regressions 
price yield APH CAT GRP CRC SRA 
S/bushel bu/acre $100 million 
mean 2.50 119.2 2.465 0.645 0.065 1.366 -0.348 
St. dev. 0.35 19.1 2.366 0.67 0.099 1.312 3.112 
min 1.48 81.1 0.017 0.002 0 0.019 -16.043 
max 3.92 149.5 11.726 3.795 0.478 8.266 2.827 
VAR(.05) 1.98 88.2 7.105 2.033 0.294 4.049 -6.617 
VAR(.10) 2.08 91.2 6.108 1.638 0.237 3.319 -4.963 
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